相关论文: Revisiting the state-space model of unawareness

We show that the knowledge of an agent carrying non-trivial unawareness violates the standard property of 'necessitation', therefore necessitation cannot be used to refute the standard state-space model. A revised version of necessitation…

We propose a model of unawareness that remains close to the paradigm of Aumann's model for knowledge [R. J. Aumann, International Journal of Game Theory 28 (1999) 263-300]: just as Aumann uses a correspondence on a state space to define an…

The aim of this study is to formally express awareness for modeling practical agent communication. The notion of awareness has been proposed as a set of propositions for each agent, to which he/she pays attention, and has contributed to…

Awareness has been shown to be a useful addition to standard epistemic logic for many applications. However, standard propositional logics for knowledge and awareness cannot express the fact that an agent knows that there are facts of which…

In earlier work, we proposed a logic that extends the Logic of General Awareness of Fagin and Halpern [1988] by allowing quantification over primitive propositions. This makes it possible to express the fact that an agent knows that there…

This paper reconsiders the problem of the absent-minded driver who must choose between alternatives with different payoff with imperfect recall and varying degrees of knowledge of the system. The classical absent-minded driver problem…

We introduce a new semantics for a multi-agent epistemic operator of knowing how, based on an indistinguishability relation between plans. Our proposal is, arguably, closer to the standard presentation of knowing that modalities in…

The paper proposes to treat agent awareness as a form of knowledge, breaking the tradition in the existing literature on awareness. It distinguishes the de re and de dicto forms of such knowledge. The work introduces two modalities…

The impossibility theorem of Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini has been thought to demonstrate that standard state-space models cannot be used to represent unawareness. We first show that Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini do not establish this claim.…

The ability of an agent to comprehend a sentence is tightly connected to the agent's prior experiences and background knowledge. The paper suggests to interpret comprehension as a modality and proposes a complete bimodal logical system that…

We develop a modal logic to capture partial awareness. The logic has three building blocks: objects, properties, and concepts. Properties are unary predicates on objects; concepts are Boolean combinations of properties. We take an agent to…

We present a behavioral definition of an agent's perceived implication that uniquely identifies a subjective state-space representing her view of a decision problem, and which may differ from the modeler's. By examining belief updating…

A network of agents attempt to learn some unknown state of the world drawn by nature from a finite set. Agents observe private signals conditioned on the true state, and form beliefs about the unknown state accordingly. Each agent may face…

Agents are a special kind of AI-based software in that they interact in complex environments and have increased potential for emergent behaviour. Explaining such emergent behaviour is key to deploying trustworthy AI, but the increasing…

We develop a logical framework for reasoning about knowledge and evidence in which the agent may be uncertain about how to interpret their evidence. Rather than representing an evidential state as a fixed subset of the state space, our…

Reasoning abilities of human beings are limited. Logics that treat logical inference for human knowledge should reflect these limited abilities. Logic of awareness is one of those logics. In the logic, what an agent with a limited reasoning…

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has…

We investigate how to model the beliefs of an agent who becomes more aware. We use the framework of Halpern and Rego (2013) by adding probability, and define a notion of a model transition that describes constraints on how, if an agent…

Formal verification of intelligent agents is often computationally infeasible due to state-space explosion. We present a tool for reducing the impact of the explosion by means of state abstraction that is (a) easy to use and understand by…

We introduce a novel semantics for a multi-agent epistemic operator of knowing how, based on an indistinguishability relation between plans. Our proposal is, arguably, closer to the standard presentation of knowing that modalities in…