相关论文: Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Au…

Proportional dynamics, originated from peer-to-peer file sharing systems, models a decentralized price-learning process in Fisher markets. Previously, items in the dynamics operate independently of one another, and each is assumed to belong…

The study of repeated interactions between a learner and a utility-maximizing optimizer has yielded deep insights into the manipulability of learning algorithms. However, existing literature primarily focuses on independent, unlinked…

We study an assortment optimization problem under a multi-purchase choice model in which customers choose a bundle of up to one product from each of two product categories. Different bundles have different utilities and the bundle price is…

Motivated by demand-side management in smart grids, a decentralized controlled Markov chain formulation is proposed to model a homogeneous population of users with binary demands (i.e., off or on). The binary demands often arise in…

We study the inefficiency of mixed equilibria, expressed as the price of anarchy, of all-pay auctions in three different environments: combinatorial, multi-unit and single-item auctions. First, we consider item-bidding combinatorial…

We efficiently solve the optimal multi-dimensional mechanism design problem for independent bidders with arbitrary demand constraints when either the number of bidders is a constant or the number of items is a constant. In the first…

The problem of robust dynamic pricing of an abstract commodity, whose inventory is specified at an initial time but never subsequently replenished, originally studied by Perakis and Sood (2006) in discrete time, is considered from the…

We study a general class of repeated auctions, such as the ones found in electricity markets, as multi-agent games between the bidders. In such a repeated setting, bidders can adapt their strategies online based on the data observed in the…

This paper studies price-based spectrum access control in cognitive radio networks, which characterizes network operators' service provisions to delay-sensitive secondary users (SUs) via pricing strategies. Based on the two paradigms of…

As distributed energy resources (DERs) proliferate, future power system will need new market platforms enabling prosumers to trade various electricity and grid-support products. However, prosumers often exhibit complex, product…

This paper presents a multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithm to represent strategic bidding behavior in freight transport markets. Using this algorithm, we investigate whether feasible market equilibriums arise without any central…

Multi-agent contract design has largely evaluated contracts through the lens of pure Nash equilibria (PNE). This focus, however, is not without loss: In general, the principal can strictly gain by recommending a complex, possibly…

In this paper, we consider a recent cellular network connection paradigm, known as user-provided network (UPN), where users share their connectivity and act as an access point for other users. To incentivize user participation in this…

Sequential allocation is a simple mechanism for sharing multiple indivisible items. We study strategic behavior in sequential allocation. In particular, we consider Nash dynamics, as well as the computation and Pareto optimality of pure…

Prosumer operators are dealing with extensive challenges to participate in short-term electricity markets while taking uncertainties into account. Challenges such as variation in demand, solar energy, wind power, and electricity prices as…

We address the problem of executing large client orders in continuous double-auction markets under time and liquidity constraints. We propose a model predictive control (MPC) framework that balances three competing objectives: order…

Distributed Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problem for multi-coalition games has attracted increasing attention in recent years, but the research mainly focuses on the case without agreement demand within coalitions. This paper considers a…

Using duality theory techniques we derive simple, closed-form formulas for bounding the optimal revenue of a monopolist selling many heterogeneous goods, in the case where the buyer's valuations for the items come i.i.d. from a uniform…

We study the problem of designing a two-sided market (double auction) to maximize the gains from trade (social welfare) under the constraints of (dominant-strategy) incentive compatibility and budget-balance. Our goal is to do so for an…

We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…