相关论文: Minimalist Market Design: A Framework for Economis…

We present the proof-of-concept for minimalist market design (S\"{o}nmez, 2023) as an effective methodology to enhance an institution based on the desiderata of stakeholders with minimal interference. Four objectives-respecting merit,…

Researchers have long proposed using economic approaches to resource allocation in computer systems. However, few of these proposals became operational, let alone commercial. Questions persist about the economic approach regarding its…

Exchange markets are a significant type of market economy, in which each agent holds a budget and certain (divisible) resources available for trading. Most research on equilibrium in exchange economies is based on an environment of…

The intermittent nature of renewable energy resources creates extra challenges in the operation and control of the electricity grid. Demand flexibility markets can help in dealing with these challenges by introducing incentives for…

Classic market design theory is rooted in static models where all participants trade simultaneously. In contrast, modern platform-mediated digital markets are fundamentally dynamic, defined by the asynchronous and stochastic arrival of…

A financial market is a system resulting from the complex interaction between participants in a closed economy. We propose a minimal microscopic model of the financial market economy based on the real economy's symmetry constraint and…

Although both data availability and the demand for accurate forecasts are increasing, collaboration between stakeholders is often constrained by data ownership and competitive interests. In contrast to recent proposals within cooperative…

We introduce a minimal Agent Based Model for financial markets to understand the nature and Self-Organization of the Stylized Facts. The model is minimal in the sense that we try to identify the essential ingredients to reproduce the main…

Given an initial matching and a policy objective on the distribution of agent types to institutions, we study the existence of a mechanism that weakly improves the distributional objective and satisfies constrained efficiency, individual…

Optimization is widely used for decision making across various domains, valued for its ability to improve efficiency. However, poor implementation practices can lead to unintended consequences, particularly in socioeconomic contexts where…

Designing a financial market that works well is very important for developing and maintaining an advanced economy, but is not easy because changing detailed rules, even ones that seem trivial, sometimes causes unexpected large impacts and…

We develop a general framework for incorporating distributional preferences in market design. We identify the structural properties of these preferences that guarantee the path independence of choice rules. In decentralized settings, a…

Classical approaches to experimental design assume that intervening on one unit does not affect other units. There are many important settings, however, where this non-interference assumption does not hold, as when running experiments on…

Auctions are markets with strict regulations governing the information available to traders in the market and the possible actions they can take. Since well designed auctions achieve desirable economic outcomes, they have been widely used…

One goal of applied operations research is to improve decisions in practice. This requires modelers and stakeholders to have a shared understanding of the system and for the developed model to reflect the system's core dynamics. There are…

As foundation models are increasingly deployed as interacting agents in multi-agent systems, their collective behavior raises new challenges for trustworthiness, transparency, and accountability. Traditional coordination mechanisms, such as…

Considering the sequential clearing of energy and reserves in Europe, enabling inter-area reserve exchange requires optimally allocating inter-area transmission capacities between these two markets. To achieve this, we provide a…

We study mechanism design when a designer repeatedly uses a fixed mechanism to interact with strategic agents who learn from observing their allocations. We introduce a static framework, calibrated mechanism design, requiring mechanisms to…

The electricity market, which was initially designed for dispatchable power plants and inflexible demand, is being increasingly challenged by new trends, such as the high penetration of intermittent renewables and the transformation of the…

We study resource allocation in two-sided markets from a fundamental perspective and introduce a general modeling and algorithmic framework to effectively incorporate the complex and multidimensional aspects of fairness. Our main technical…