相关论文: Heterogeneous Noise and Stable Miscoordination

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

This paper considers games where the utilities for agents are the sum of a term proportional to a social utility, and another term that is an individual cost or reward. The agents are assumed to be irrational in their perception of the…

Game-theoretical models where the rules of the game and the interaction structure both coevolves with the game dynamics -- multiadaptive games -- capture very flexible situations where cooperation among selfish agents can emerge. In this…

We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private signals, and interact in a general dynamic setting. We…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

We study the problem of finding robust equilibria in multiplayer concurrent games with mean payoff objectives. A $(k,t)$-robust equilibrium is a strategy profile such that no coalition of size $k$ can improve the payoff of one its member by…

In this paper, we formulate an evolutionarymultiple access control game with continuousvariable actions and coupled constraints. We characterize equilibria of the game and show that the pure equilibria are Pareto optimal and also resilient…

Coordination games with explicit spatial or relational structure are of interest to economists, ecologists, sociologists, and others studying emergent global properties in collective behavior. When assemblies of individuals seek to…

This paper examines equilibria in dynamic two-sided matching games, extending Gale and Shapley's foundational model to a non-cooperative, decentralized, and dynamic framework. We focus on markets where agents have utility functions and…

Whilst network coordination games and network anti-coordination games have received a considerable amount of attention in the literature, network games with coexisting coordinating and anti-coordinating players are known to exhibit more…

This paper examines the convergence of no-regret learning in games with continuous action sets. For concreteness, we focus on learning via "dual averaging", a widely used class of no-regret learning schemes where players take small steps…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…

We consider control of heterogeneous players repeatedly playing an anti-coordination network game. In an anti-coordination game, each player has an incentive to differentiate its action from its neighbors. At each round of play, players…

We extend the indirect evolutionary approach to the selection of (possibly misspecified) models. Agents with different models match in pairs to play a stage game, where models define feasible beliefs about game parameters and about others'…

We consider a stochastic tournament game in which each player is rewarded based on her rank in terms of the completion time of her own task and is subject to cost of effort. When players are homogeneous and the rewards are purely rank…

An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences…

This paper relaxes the common prior assumption in the public and private information game of Morris and Shin (2000, 2004). For the generalized game, where the agent's prior expectations are heterogenous, it derives a sharp condition for the…

Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…

We consider the dynamics, existence and stability of the equilibrium states for large populations of individuals who can play various types of non--cooperative games. The players imitate the most attractive strategies, and the choice is…