相关论文: Robust Regulation of Firms' Access to Consumer Dat…

We study the regulation of a monopolistic firm using a robust-design approach. We solve for the policy that minimizes the regulator's worst-case regret, where the regret is the difference between his complete-information payoff minus his…

Central to privacy concerns is that firms may use consumer data to price discriminate. A common policy response is that consumers should be given control over which firms access their data and how. Since firms learn about a consumer's…

This paper studies optimal mechanisms for collecting and trading data. Consumers benefit from revealing information about their tastes to a service provider because this improves the service. However, the information is also valuable to a…

We study a problem inspired by regulated health insurance markets, such as those created by the government in the Affordable Care Act Exchanges or by employers when they contract with private insurers to provide plans for their employees.…

This paper revisits the classic instrument choice problem in a setting with consumption externalities, through the lens of robust mechanism design. A regulator can implement any incentive-compatible policy but is uncertain about how…

We consider the problem of how to regulate an oligopoly when firms have private information about their costs. In the environment, consumers make discrete choices over goods, and minimal structure is placed on the manner in which firms…

Access to data and data processing, including the use of machine learning techniques, has become significantly easier and cheaper in recent years. Nevertheless, solutions that can be widely adopted by regulators for market monitoring and…

The internet is a common place for businesses to collect and store as much client data as possible and computer storage capacity has increased exponentially due to this trend. Businesses utilize this data to enhance customer satisfaction,…

We analyze digital markets where a monopolist platform uses data to match multiproduct sellers with heterogeneous consumers who can purchase both on and off the platform. The platform sells targeted ads to sellers that recommend their…

In modern markets, many companies offer so-called 'free' services and monetize consumer data they collect through those services. This paper argues that consumer law and data protection law can usefully complement each other. Data…

I characterize the consumer-optimal market segmentation in competitive markets where multiple firms selling differentiated products to consumers with unit demand. This segmentation is public---in that each firm observes the same market…

We study how market segmentation affects consumers when a monopolist can adjust both prices and product qualities across segments, engaging in second- and third-degree price discrimination simultaneously. We characterize the…

When sample data are governed by an unknown sequence of independent but possibly non-identical distributions, the data-generating process (DGP) in general cannot be perfectly identified from the data. For making decisions facing such…

Today, web-based companies use user data to provide and enhance services to users, both individually and collectively. Some also analyze user data for other purposes, for example to select advertisements or price offers for users. Some even…

We study the robust regulation of contracts in moral hazard problems. A firm offers a contract to incentivise a worker protected by limited liability. A regulator restricts the set of permissible contracts to (i) improve efficiency and (ii)…

The management of data and digital assets poses various challenges, including the need to adhere to legal requirements with respect to personal data protection and copyright. Usage control technologies could be used by software platform…

A monopolist offers personalized prices to consumers with unit demand, heterogeneous values, and idiosyncratic costs, who differ in a protected characteristic, such as race or gender. The seller is subject to a non-discrimination…

We study procurement design when the buyer is uncertain about both the value of the good and the seller's cost. The buyer has a conjectured model but does not fully trust it. She first identifies mechanisms that maximize her worst-case…

Consider sellers in a competitive market that use algorithms to adapt their prices from data that they collect. In such a context it is plausible that algorithms could arrive at prices that are higher than the competitive prices and this…

This paper extends the utility maximization literature by combining partial information and (robust) regulatory constraints. Partial information is characterized by the fact that the stock price itself is observable by the optimizing…