中文
相关论文

相关论文: Maximizing Miner Revenue in Transaction Fee Mechan…

200 篇论文

Transaction fees represent a major incentive in many blockchain systems as a way to incentivize processing transactions. Unfortunately, they also introduce an enormous amount of incentive asymmetry compared to alternatives like fixed block…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-02-15 Michael Tang , Alex Zhang

In blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum, users compete in a transaction fee auction to get their transactions confirmed in the next block. A line of recent works set forth the desiderata for a "dream" transaction fee mechanism (TFM),…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2022-11-07 Hao Chung , Elaine Shi

The recently proposed Transaction Fee Mechanism (TFM) literature studies the strategic interaction between the miner of a block and the transaction creators (or users) in a blockchain. In a TFM, the miner includes transactions that maximize…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-02-08 Sankarshan Damle , Varul Srivastava , Sujit Gujar

Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design (TFM). Unlike the classical mechanism design literature, in the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-02-21 Elaine Shi , Hao Chung , Ke Wu

Demand for blockchains such as Bitcoin and Ethereum is far larger than supply, necessitating a mechanism that selects a subset of transactions to include "on-chain" from the pool of all pending transactions. This paper investigates the…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2023-12-27 Tim Roughgarden

In blockchain systems, the design of transaction fee mechanisms is essential for stability and satisfaction for both miners and users. A recent work has proven the impossibility of collusion-proof mechanisms that achieve both non-zero miner…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-12-25 Xi Chen , David Simchi-Levi , Zishuo Zhao , Yuan Zhou

Transaction Fee Mechanism Design studies auctions run by untrusted miners for transaction inclusion in a blockchain. Under previously-considered desiderata, an auction is considered `good' if, informally-speaking, each party (i.e., the…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-10-25 Aadityan Ganesh , Clayton Thomas , S. Matthew Weinberg

Blockchain-based cryptocurrencies prioritize transactions based on their fees, creating a unique kind of fee market. Empirically, this market has failed to yield stable equilibria with predictable prices for desired levels of service. We…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2019-01-23 Soumya Basu , David Easley , Maureen O'Hara , Emin Gün Sirer

Cryptocurrencies employ auction-esque transaction fee mechanisms (TFMs) to allocate transactions to blocks, and to determine how much fees miners can collect from transactions. Several impossibility results show that TFMs that satisfy a…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-05-24 Yotam Gafni , Aviv Yaish

The incentive-compatibility properties of blockchain transaction fee mechanisms have been investigated with *passive* block producers that are motivated purely by the net rewards earned at the consensus layer. This paper introduces a model…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-10-04 Maryam Bahrani , Pranav Garimidi , Tim Roughgarden

Mining processes of Bitcoin and similar cryptocurrencies are currently incentivized with voluntary transaction fees and fixed block rewards which will halve gradually to zero. In the setting where optional and arbitrary transaction fee…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-07-14 Tiantian Gong , Mohsen Minaei , Wenhai Sun , Aniket Kate

Trading on decentralized exchanges has been one of the primary use cases for permissionless blockchains with daily trading volume exceeding billions of U.S.~dollars. In the status quo, users broadcast transactions and miners are responsible…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , David C. Parkes

We initiate the study of transaction fee mechanism design for blockchain protocols in which multiple block producers contribute to the production of each block. Our contributions include: - We propose an extensive-form (multi-stage) game…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-05-27 Pranav Garimidi , Lioba Heimbach , Tim Roughgarden

Blockchain networks are facing increasingly heterogeneous computational demands, and in response, protocol designers have started building specialized infrastructure to supply that demand. This paper introduces Resonance: a new kind of…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-11-20 Maryam Bahrani , Naveen Durvasula

With the widespread adoption of blockchain technology, the transaction fee mechanism (TFM) in blockchain systems has become a prominent research topic. An ideal TFM should satisfy user incentive compatibility (UIC), miner incentive…

分布式、并行与集群计算 · 计算机科学 2024-06-28 Kun Li , Guangpeng Qi , Guangyong Shang , Wanli Deng , Minghui Xu , Xiuzhen Cheng

In cryptocurrencies, transaction fees are typically exclusively paid in the native platform currency. This restriction causes a wide range of challenges, such as deteriorated user experience, mandatory rent payments by decentralized…

计算机与社会 · 计算机科学 2020-04-20 István András Seres

In the Bitcoin system, transaction fees serve as an incentive for blockchain confirmations. In general, a transaction with a higher fee is likely to be included in the next block mined, whereas a transaction with a smaller fee or no fee may…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2024-05-27 Limeng Zhang , Rui Zhou , Qing Liu , Chengfei Liu , M. Ali Babar

The Bitcoin payment system involves two agent types: Users that transact with the currency and pay fees and miners in charge of authorizing transactions and securing the system in return for these fees. Two of Bitcoin's challenges are (i)…

密码学与安全 · 计算机科学 2022-03-15 Ron Lavi , Or Sattath , Aviv Zohar

Blockchains deploy Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) to determine which user transactions to include in blocks and determine their payments (i.e., transaction fees). Increasing demand and scarce block resources have led to high user…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2024-01-25 Sankarshan Damle , Manisha Padala , Sujit Gujar

Blockchains have popularized automated market makers (AMMs). An AMM exchange is an application running on a blockchain which maintains a pool of crypto-assets and automatically trades assets with users governed by some pricing function that…

计算机科学与博弈论 · 计算机科学 2025-09-16 T-H. Hubert Chan , Ke Wu , Elaine Shi
‹ 上一页 1 2 3 10 下一页 ›