相关论文: Thermal (and Hybrid Thermal/Audio) Side-Channel At…

As a warm-blooded mammalian species, we humans routinely leave thermal residues on various objects with which we come in contact. This includes common input devices, such as keyboards, that are used for entering (among other things) secret…

Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic…

Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…

Cloud services have become an essential infrastructure for enterprises and individuals. Access to these cloud services is typically governed by Identity and Access Management systems, where user authentication often relies on passwords.…

Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar…

We present the first acoustic side-channel attack that recovers what users type on the virtual keyboard of their touch-screen smartphone or tablet. When a user taps the screen with a finger, the tap generates a sound wave that propagates on…

Standalone virtual reality (VR) headsets process highly sensitive personal, professional, and health-related data, yet their susceptibility to non-contact physical side channels remains largely unexplored. Existing side-channel attacks…

Side-channel attacks are important security challenges as they reveal sensitive information about on-chip activities. Among such attacks, the thermal side-channel has been shown to disclose the activities of key functional blocks and even…

Credential theft and remote attacks are the most serious threats to user authentication mechanisms. The crux of these problems is that we cannot control such behaviors. However, if a password does not contain user secrets, stealing it is…

Microarchitectural timing attacks exploit subtle timing variations caused by hardware behaviors to leak sensitive information. In this paper, we introduce MCHammer, a novel side-channel technique that leverages machine clears induced by…

With recent developments in deep learning, the ubiquity of micro-phones and the rise in online services via personal devices, acoustic side channel attacks present a greater threat to keyboards than ever. This paper presents a practical…

Side-channel attacks try to extract secret information from a system by analyzing different side-channel signatures, such as power consumption, electromagnetic emanation, thermal dissipation, acoustics, time, etc. Power-based side-channel…

Acoustic side-channel attacks (ASCA) on keyboards pose a significant security risk, as keystrokes can be inferred from typing acoustics, revealing sensitive information. Prior ASCA studies are limited by small-scale datasets with restricted…

This paper studies leakage of user passwords and PINs based on observations of typing feedback on screens or from projectors in the form of masked characters that indicate keystrokes. To this end, we developed an attack called Password and…

Personal Identification Numbers (PIN) are widely used as authentication method for systems such as Automated Teller Machines (ATMs) and Point of Sale (PoS). Input devices (PIN pads) usually give the user a feedback sound when a key is…

Temperature sensing and control systems are widely used in the closed-loop control of critical processes such as maintaining the thermal stability of patients, or in alarm systems for detecting temperature-related hazards. However, the…

The drive to create thinner, lighter, and more energy efficient devices has resulted in modern SoCs being forced to balance a delicate tradeoff between power consumption, heat dissipation, and execution speed (i.e., frequency). While…

Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical…

Analog compute-in-memory (CIM) systems are promising for deep neural network (DNN) inference acceleration due to their energy efficiency and high throughput. However, as the use of DNNs expands, protecting user input privacy has become…

Compression algorithms are widely used as they save memory without losing data. However, elimination of redundant symbols and sequences in data leads to a compression side channel. So far, compression attacks have only focused on the…