相关论文: On Poisoned Wardrop Equilibrium in Congestion Game…

This article studies the value of information in route choice decisions when a fraction of players have access to high accuracy information about traffic incidents relative to others. To model such environments, we introduce a Bayesian…

To systematically study the implications of additional information about routes provided to certain users (e.g., via GPS-based route guidance systems), we introduce a new class of congestion games in which users have differing information…

Data injection attacks have recently emerged as a significant threat on the smart power grid. By launching data injection attacks, an adversary can manipulate the real-time locational marginal prices to obtain economic benefits. Despite the…

We consider a two-player zero-sum network routing game in which a router wants to maximize the amount of legitimate traffic that flows from a given source node to a destination node and an attacker wants to block as much legitimate traffic…

Traffic navigation services have gained widespread adoption in recent years. The route recommendations generated by these services often leads to severe congestion on urban streets, raising concerns from neighboring residents and city…

In many multiagent settings, such as electric vehicle charging and traffic routing, agents must make decisions in the face of uncertain behavior exhibited by others. Often, this uncertainty arises from multiple sources, such as incomplete…

We study Stackelberg (leader--follower) tuning of network parameters (tolls, capacities, incentives) in combinatorial congestion games, where selfish users choose discrete routes (or other combinatorial strategies) and settle at a…

Data poisoning attacks, in which a malicious adversary aims to influence a model by injecting "poisoned" data into the training process, have attracted significant recent attention. In this work, we take a closer look at existing poisoning…

Strategic interaction in congested systems is commonly modelled using Stackelberg games, where competing leaders anticipate the behaviour of self-interested followers. A key limitation of existing models is that they typically ignore agents…

Interdicting a criminal with limited police resources is a challenging task as the criminal changes location over time. The size of the large transportation network further adds to the difficulty of this scenario. To tackle this issue, we…

Stability of Wardrop equilibria is analyzed for dynamical transportation networks in which the drivers' route choices are influenced by information at multiple temporal and spatial scales. The considered model involves a continuum of…

We study an information design problem in transportation networks, in the presence of a random state that affects the travel times on the links. An omniscient system planner -- aiming at reducing congestion -- observes the network state…

The Stackelberg game depicts a leader-follower relationship wherein decisions are made sequentially, and the Stackelberg equilibrium represents an expected optimal solution when the leader can anticipate the rational response of the…

When learning in strategic environments, a key question is whether agents can overcome uncertainty about their preferences to achieve outcomes they could have achieved absent any uncertainty. Can they do this solely through interactions…

Routing games are amongst the most studied classes of games. Their two most well-known properties are that learning dynamics converge to equilibria and that all equilibria are approximately optimal. In this work, we perform a stress test…

Route controlled autonomous vehicles could have a significant impact in reducing congestion in the future. Before applying multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms to route control, we can model the system using a congestion game to…

Unlearnable example attacks are data poisoning attacks aiming to degrade the clean test accuracy of deep learning by adding imperceptible perturbations to the training samples, which can be formulated as a bi-level optimization problem.…

Adversarial optimal transport has been proven useful as a mathematical formulation to model resource allocation problems to maximize the efficiency of transportation with an adversary, who modifies the data. It is often the case, however,…

Vehicle bypassing is known to negatively affect delays at traffic diverges. However, due to the complexities of this phenomenon, accurate and yet simple models of such lane change maneuvers are hard to develop. In this work, we present a…

This paper studies a Stackelberg game wherein a sender (leader) attempts to shape the information of a less informed receiver (follower) who in turn takes an action that determines the payoff for both players. The sender chooses signals to…