相关论文: Fast Convergence of Optimistic Gradient Ascent in …

Considering a class of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms in non-cooperative settings, we provide local convergence guarantees to a neighborhood of a stable local Nash equilibrium. In particular, we consider continuous games…

We consider the problem of minimizing a smooth convex function by reducing the optimization to computing the Nash equilibrium of a particular zero-sum convex-concave game. Zero-sum games can be solved using online learning dynamics, where a…

We show for the first time, to our knowledge, that it is possible to reconcile in online learning in zero-sum games two seemingly contradictory objectives: vanishing time-average regret and non-vanishing step sizes. This phenomenon, that we…

In this work, we establish near-linear and strong convergence for a natural first-order iterative algorithm that simulates Von Neumann's Alternating Projections method in zero-sum games. First, we provide a precise analysis of Optimistic…

An $\alpha$-potential game is a multi-player non-cooperative interaction in which a global potential function approximates individual player rewards up to a structural bias $\alpha$. While identifying a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in generic…

We derive the rate of convergence to the strongly variationally stable Nash equilibrium in a convex game, for a zeroth-order learning algorithm. Though we do not assume strong monotonicity of the game, our rates for the one-point feedback…

Scale-invariance in games has recently emerged as a widely valued desirable property. Yet, almost all fast convergence guarantees in learning in games require prior knowledge of the utility scale. To address this, we develop learning…

Policy gradient methods have become a staple of any single-agent reinforcement learning toolbox, due to their combination of desirable properties: iterate convergence, efficient use of stochastic trajectory feedback, and theoretically-sound…

We develop a flexible stochastic approximation framework for analyzing the long-run behavior of learning in games (both continuous and finite). The proposed analysis template incorporates a wide array of popular learning algorithms,…

We study online optimization methods for zero-sum games, a fundamental problem in adversarial learning in machine learning, economics, and many other domains. Traditional methods approximate Nash equilibria (NE) using either regret-based…

We study the performance of the gradient play algorithm for stochastic games (SGs), where each agent tries to maximize its own total discounted reward by making decisions independently based on current state information which is shared…

Many recent AI architectures are inspired by zero-sum games, however, the behavior of their dynamics is still not well understood. Inspired by this, we study standard gradient descent ascent (GDA) dynamics in a specific class of non-convex…

A conceptually appealing approach for learning Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) is to convert them to Normal-Form Games (NFGs). This approach enables us to directly translate state-of-the-art techniques and analyses in NFGs to learning EFGs, but…

We address scaling up equilibrium computation in Mean Field Games (MFGs) using Online Mirror Descent (OMD). We show that continuous-time OMD provably converges to a Nash equilibrium under a natural and well-motivated set of monotonicity…

This paper considers convex games involving multiple agents that aim to minimize their own cost functions using locally available information. A common assumption in the study of such games is that the agents are symmetric, meaning that…

Last-iterate convergence has received extensive study in two player zero-sum games starting from bilinear, convex-concave up to settings that satisfy the MVI condition. Typical methods that exhibit last-iterate convergence for the…

Regret-based algorithms are highly efficient at finding approximate Nash equilibria in sequential games such as poker games. However, most regret-based algorithms, including counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) and its variants, rely on…

This work is dedicated to the algorithm design in a competitive framework, with the primary goal of learning a stable equilibrium. We consider the dynamic price competition between two firms operating within an opaque marketplace, where…

Most existing results about \emph{last-iterate convergence} of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results…

The paper studies fictitious play (FP) learning dynamics in continuous time. It is shown that in almost every potential game, and for almost every initial condition, the rate of convergence of FP is exponential. In particular, the paper…