相关论文: Online Learning in Supply-Chain Games

Most microeconomic models of interest involve optimizing a piecewise linear function. These include contract design in hidden-action principal-agent problems, selling an item in posted-price auctions, and bidding in first-price auctions.…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

We study online learning problems in which a decision maker has to take a sequence of decisions subject to $m$ long-term constraints. The goal of the decision maker is to maximize their total reward, while at the same time achieving small…

This study considers online learning with general directed feedback graphs. For this problem, we present best-of-both-worlds algorithms that achieve nearly tight regret bounds for adversarial environments as well as poly-logarithmic regret…

We study learning in a dynamically evolving environment modeled as a Markov game between a learner and a strategic opponent that can adapt to the learner's strategies. While most existing works in Markov games focus on external regret as…

Wholesale price contracts are known to be associated with double marginalization effects, which prevents supply chains from achieving their true market share. In a dynamic setting under information asymmetry, these inefficiencies manifest…

Online learning is a powerful tool for analyzing iterative algorithms. However, the classic adversarial setup sometimes fails to capture certain regularity in online problems in practice. Motivated by this, we establish a new setup, called…

We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

We explore brokerage between traders in an online learning framework. At any round $t$, two traders meet to exchange an asset, provided the exchange is mutually beneficial. The broker proposes a trading price, and each trader tries to sell…

We study the problem of full-information online learning in the "bounded recall" setting popular in the study of repeated games. An online learning algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is $M$-$\textit{bounded-recall}$ if its output at time $t$ can be…

We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…

In the setting of online learning, Implicit algorithms turn out to be highly successful from a practical standpoint. However, the tightest regret analyses only show marginal improvements over Online Mirror Descent. In this work, we shed…

Learning theory has largely focused on two main learning scenarios. The first is the classical statistical setting where instances are drawn i.i.d. from a fixed distribution and the second scenario is the online learning, completely…

Making an informed decision -- for example, when choosing a career or housing -- requires knowledge about the available options. Such knowledge is generally acquired through costly trial and error, but this learning process can be disrupted…

Autonomous and learning agents increasingly participate in markets - setting prices, placing bids, ordering inventory. Such agents are not just aiming to optimize in an uncertain environment; they are making decisions in a game-theoretical…

Stochastic and adversarial data are two widely studied settings in online learning. But many optimization tasks are neither i.i.d. nor fully adversarial, which makes it of fundamental interest to get a better theoretical understanding of…

We study online fair division when there are a finite number of item types and the player values for the items are drawn randomly from distributions with unknown means. In this setting, a sequence of indivisible items arrives according to a…

We consider a family of learning strategies for online optimization problems that evolve in continuous time and we show that they lead to no regret. From a more traditional, discrete-time viewpoint, this continuous-time approach allows us…

We introduce a reinforcement learning framework for economic design where the interaction between the environment designer and the participants is modeled as a Stackelberg game. In this game, the designer (leader) sets up the rules of the…

We address the problem of maximizing Gain from Trade (GFT) in repeated buyer-seller exchanges subject to global budget balance constraints. While this problem is well-understood in purely adversarial and stochastic settings, these…