相关论文: Attack of the Knights: A Non Uniform Cache Side-Ch…

Cache occupancy attacks exploit the shared nature of cache hierarchies to infer a victim's activities by monitoring overall cache usage, unlike access-driven cache attacks that focus on specific cache lines or sets. There exists some prior…

On Intel Sandy Bridge processor, last level cache (LLC) is divided into cache slices and all physical addresses are distributed across the cache slices using an hash function. With this undocumented hash function existing, it is impossible…

Attacks on the microarchitecture of modern processors have become a practical threat to security and privacy in desktop and cloud computing. Recently, cache attacks have successfully been demonstrated on ARM based mobile devices, suggesting…

The security of modern electronic devices relies on secret keys stored on secure hardware modules as the root-of-trust (RoT). Extracting those keys would break the security of the entire system. As shown before, sophisticated side-channel…

Power side-channel analysis (SCA) has been of immense interest to most embedded designers to evaluate the physical security of the system. This work presents profiling-based cross-device power SCA attacks using deep learning techniques on…

In this paper we study reaction and timing attacks against cryptosystems based on sparse parity-check codes, which encompass low-density parity-check (LDPC) codes and moderate-density parity-check (MDPC) codes. We show that the feasibility…

In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on…

We present the first micro-architectural side-channel attack which runs entirely in the browser. In contrast to other works in this genre, this attack does not require the attacker to install any software on the victim's machine -- to…

We consider an echo-assisted communication model wherein block-coded messages, when transmitted across several frames, reach the destination as multiple noisy copies. We address adversarial attacks on such models wherein a subset of the…

While side-channel leakage is traditionally evaluated from a fabricated chip, it is more time-efficient and cost-effective to do so during the design phase of the chip. We present a methodology to rank the gates of a design according to…

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in sensitive domains including healthcare, legal services, and confidential communications, where privacy is paramount. This paper introduces Whisper Leak, a side-channel attack that…

We present a result of side-channel-secure (SCS) quantum key distribution (QKD) under fully realistic conditions. Our result is not only measurement-device independent but also effective with imperfect (and unstable) source devices…

In the main text published at USENIX Security 2025, we presented a systematic analysis of the role of cache occupancy in the design considerations for randomized caches (from the perspectives of performance and security). On the performance…

Covert channel attacks represent a significant threat to system security, leveraging shared resources to clandestinely transmit information from highly secure systems, thereby violating the system's security policies. These attacks exploit…

To improve efficiency, nearly all parallel processing units (CPUs and GPUs) implement relaxed memory models in which memory operations may be re-ordered, i.e., executed out-of-order. Prior testing work in this area found that memory…

Caches on the modern commodity CPUs have become one of the major sources of side-channel leakages and been abused as a new attack vector. To thwart the cache-based side-channel attacks, two types of countermeasures have been proposed:…

Quantum key distribution (QKD) theoretically provides unconditional security between remote parties. However, guaranteeing practical security through device characterisation alone is challenging in real-world implementations due to the…

In this paper we investigate the feasibility of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on shared caches in multicore platforms. With carefully engineered attacker tasks, we are able to cause more than 300X execution time increases on a victim task…

Offline attacks on passwords are increasingly commonplace and dangerous. An offline adversary is limited only by the amount of computational resources he or she is willing to invest to crack a user's password. The danger is compounded by…

Transient execution attacks utilize micro-architectural covert channels to leak secrets that should not have been accessible during logical program execution. Commonly used micro-architectural covert channels are those that leave lasting…