相关论文: Attack of the Knights: A Non Uniform Cache Side-Ch…
Last-level cache side-channel attacks have been mostly demonstrated in highly-controlled, quiescent local environments. Hence, it is unclear whether such attacks are feasible in a production cloud environment. In the cloud, side channels…
The transient execution attack is a type of attack leveraging the vulnerability of modern CPU optimization technologies. New attacks surface rapidly. The side-channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to leak data. In this work,…
Side-channel attacks allow extracting secret information from the execution of cryptographic primitives by correlating the partially known computed data and the measured side-channel signal. However, to set up a successful side-channel…
We introduce the first microarchitectural side channel attacks that leverage contention on the CPU ring interconnect. There are two challenges that make it uniquely difficult to exploit this channel. First, little is known about the ring…
We present a new hardware-agnostic side-channel attack that targets one of the most fundamental software caches in modern computer systems: the operating system page cache. The page cache is a pure software cache that contains all…
Modern x86 processors have many prefetch instructions that can be used by programmers to boost performance. However, these instructions may also cause security problems. In particular, we found that on Intel processors, there are two…
We introduce a new timing side-channel attack on Intel CPU processors. Our Frontal attack exploits timing differences that arise from how the CPU frontend fetches and processes instructions while being interrupted. In particular, we observe…
Microarchitectural side channel attacks have been very prominent in security research over the last few years. Caches have been an outstanding covert channel, as they provide high resolution and generic cross-core leakage even with simple…
Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…
Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…
We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach dynamically…
We propose a novel approach for performing side-channel attacks on elliptic curve cryptography. Unlike previous approaches and inspired by the ``activity detection'' literature, we adopt a long-short-term memory (LSTM) neural network to…
Side-channel attacks have become prominent attack surfaces in cyberspace. Attackers use the side information generated by the system while performing a task. Among the various side-channel attacks, cache side-channel attacks are leading as…
Network slicing in 5G and the future 6G networks will enable the creation of multiple virtualized networks on a shared physical infrastructure. This innovative approach enables the provision of tailored networks to accommodate specific…
Cache timing attacks use shared caches in multi-core processors as side channels to extract information from victim processes. These attacks are particularly dangerous in cloud infrastructures, in which the deployed countermeasures cause…
Modern processors dynamically control their operating frequency to optimize resource utilization, maximize energy savings, and conform to system-defined constraints. If, during the execution of a software workload, the running average of…
Side-channel attacks allow to extract sensitive information from cryptographic primitives by correlating the partially known computed data and the measured side-channel signal. Starting from the raw side-channel trace, the preprocessing of…
Large language models (LLMs) possess extensive knowledge and question-answering capabilities, having been widely deployed in privacy-sensitive domains like finance and medical consultation. During LLM inferences, cache-sharing methods are…
Side-channel attacks consist of retrieving internal data from a victim system by analyzing its leakage, which usually requires proximity to the victim in the range of a few millimetres. Screaming channels are EM side channels transmitted at…
This work presents a new tool to verify the correctness of cryptographic implementations with respect to cache attacks. Our methodology discovers vulnerabilities that are hard to find with other techniques, observed as exploitable leakage.…