相关论文: Learning Equilibria in Mean-Field Games: Introduci…

Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…

Learning by experience in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) is a difficult and exciting task, due to the lack of stationarity of the environment, whose dynamics evolves as the population learns. In order to design scalable algorithms for systems…

We construct Nash-equilibria in mean-field portfolio games of optimal investment and hedging under relative performance concerns with exponential (CARA) utility preferences. Common noise dynamics are modeled by integer-valued random…

We introduce Mean-Field Trust Region Policy Optimization (MF-TRPO), a novel algorithm designed to compute approximate Nash equilibria for ergodic Mean-Field Games (MFG) in finite state-action spaces. Building on the well-established…

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical…

We present an agent-based simulator for economic systems with heterogeneous households, firms, central bank, and government agents. These agents interact to define production, consumption, and monetary flow. Each agent type has distinct…

We study risk-sensitive multi-agent reinforcement learning under general-sum Markov games, where agents optimize the entropic risk measure of rewards with possibly diverse risk preferences. We show that using the regret naively adapted from…

Recent advances at the intersection of dense large graph limits and mean field games have begun to enable the scalable analysis of a broad class of dynamical sequential games with large numbers of agents. So far, results have been largely…

In this work, we systematically investigate mean field games and mean field type control problems with multiple populations using a coupled system of forward-backward stochastic differential equations of McKean-Vlasov type stemming from…

Mean-field games (MFG) have become significant tools for solving large-scale multi-agent reinforcement learning problems under symmetry. However, the assumption of exact symmetry limits the applicability of MFGs, as real-world scenarios…

The theory of mean field games aims at studying deterministic or stochastic differential games (Nash equilibria) as the number of agents tends to infinity. Since very few mean field games have explicit or semi-explicit solutions, numerical…

Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the…

Multi-agent reinforcement learning is a challenging and active field of research due to the inherent nonstationary property and coupling between agents. A popular approach to modeling the multi-agent interactions underlying the multi-agent…

We design and analyze reinforcement learning algorithms for Graphon Mean-Field Games (GMFGs). In contrast to previous works that require the precise values of the graphons, we aim to learn the Nash Equilibrium (NE) of the regularized GMFGs…

This paper proposes a new mathematical paradigm to analyze discrete-time mean-field games. It is shown that finding Nash equilibrium solutions for a general class of discrete-time mean-field games is equivalent to solving an optimization…

This work studies non-cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) where multiple agents interact in the same environment and whose goal is to maximize the individual returns. Challenges arise when scaling up the number of agents…

We study multi-player general-sum Markov games with one of the players designated as the leader and the other players regarded as followers. In particular, we focus on the class of games where the followers are myopic, i.e., they aim to…

We study the open question of how players learn to play a social optimum pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) through repeated interactions in general-sum coordination games. A social optimum of a game is the stable Pareto-optimal state…

Regret minimization is a general approach to online optimization which plays a crucial role in many algorithms for approximating Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games. The literature mainly focuses on solving individual games in…

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game…