相关论文: A Symbolic Approach to Detecting Hardware Trojans …

The threat of hardware Trojans (HTs) and their detection is a widely studied field. While the effort for inserting a Trojan into an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) can be considered relatively high, especially when trusting…

The risk of hardware Trojans being inserted at various stages of chip production has increased in a zero-trust fabless era. To counter this, various machine learning solutions have been developed for the detection of hardware Trojans. While…

Conventional Hardware Trojan (HT) detection techniques are based on the validation of integrated circuits to determine changes in their functionality, and on non-invasive side-channel analysis to identify the variations in their physical…

Hardware Trojan detection and protection is becoming more crucial as more untrusted third parties manufacture many parts of critical systems nowadays. The most common way to detect hardware Trojans is comparing the untrusted design with a…

Cyber-physical systems rely on sensors, communication, and computing, all powered by integrated circuits (ICs). ICs are largely susceptible to various hardware attacks with malicious intents. One of the stealthiest threats is the insertion…

There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan…

Many fabless semiconductor companies outsource their designs to third-party fabrication houses. As trustworthiness of chain after outsourcing including fabrication houses is not established, any adversary in between, with malicious intent…

We introduce a new class of hardware trojans called interrupt-resilient trojans (IRTs). Our work is motivated by the observation that hardware trojan attacks on CPUs, even under favorable attack scenarios (e.g., an attacker with local…

As the semiconductor industry has shifted to a fabless paradigm, the risk of hardware Trojans being inserted at various stages of production has also increased. Recently, there has been a growing trend toward the use of machine learning…

The globalization of the Integrated Circuit (IC) supply chain has moved most of the design, fabrication, and testing process from a single trusted entity to various untrusted third-party entities around the world. The risk of using…

Hardware trojans are malicious circuits which compromise the functionality and security of an integrated circuit (IC). These circuits are manufactured directly into the silicon and cannot be fixed by security patches like software. The…

The commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) component based ecosystem provides an attractive system design paradigm due to the drastic reduction in development time and cost compared to custom solutions. However, it brings in a growing concern of…

Hardware security has risen in prominence in recent years with concerns stemming from a globalizing semiconductor supply chain and increased third-party IP (intellectual property) usage. Trojan detection is of paramount importance for…

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist,…

Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…

Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP) and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be…

A major security threat to an integrated circuit (IC) design is the Hardware Trojan attack which is a malicious modification of the design. Previously several papers have investigated into side-channel analysis to detect the presence of…

In this paper, we introduce a Learning Assisted Side Channel delay Analysis (LASCA) methodology for Hardware Trojan detection. Our proposed solution, unlike the prior art, does not require a Golden IC. Instead, it trains a Neural Network to…

Software-exploitable Hardware Trojans (HTs) enable attackers to execute unauthorized software or gain illicit access to privileged operations. This manuscript introduces a hardware-based methodology for detecting runtime HT activations…

Industrial Systems-on-Chips (SoCs) often comprise hundreds of thousands to millions of nets and millions to tens of millions of connectivity edges, making empirical evaluation of hardware-Trojan (HT) detectors on realistic designs both…