相关论文: Auction-Based vs Continuous Clearing in Local Flex…

We argue that deterministic market clearing formulations introduce arbitrary distortions between day-ahead and expected real-time prices that bias economic incentives and block diversification. We extend and analyze the stochastic clearing…

Most literature surrounding optimal bidding strategies for aggregators in European day-ahead market (DAM) considers only hourly orders. While other order types (e.g., block orders) may better represent the temporal characteristics of…

Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security system, has been applied in many applications, such as bitcoin, smart grid, and Internet-of-Things. However, running the mining process may cost too much energy consumption and computing…

There is an intrinsic value in higher integration of multi-carrier energy systems (especially gas and electricity), to increase operational flexibility in the electricity system and to improve allocation of resources in gas and electricity…

We analyze the efficiency of markets with friction, particularly power markets. We model the market as a dynamic system with $(d_t;\,t\geq 0)$ the demand process and $(s_t;\,t\geq 0)$ the supply process. Using stochastic differential…

In a recent publication, using a simple two-period model, which is already capable to capture essential non-convex multiperiod bids, Richstein et al. have shown that in the case of optimal bidding, multi-part bidding always ensures a higher…

Motivated by applications such as cloud computing, gig platforms, and blockchain auctions, we study optimal selling mechanisms for dynamic markets with stochastic supply and demand. In our model, buyers with private valuations and…

There are various undergoing efforts by system operators to set up an electricity market at the distribution level to enable a rapid and widespread deployment of distributed energy resources (DERs) and microgrids. This paper follows the…

In many markets, like electricity or cloud computing markets, providers incur large costs for keeping sufficient capacity in reserve to accommodate demand fluctuations of a mostly fixed user base. These costs are significantly affected by…

We propose and analyze a day-ahead reserve market model that handles bids from flexible loads. This pool market model takes into account the fact that a load modulation in one direction must usually be compensated later by a modulation of…

Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…

Bidding flexibility in day-ahead and intraday auctions would enable decentralized flexible resources, such as electric vehicles and heat pumps, to efficiently align their consumption with the intermittent generation of renewable energy.…

The continuous electrification of the mobility and heating sectors adds much-needed flexibility to the power system. However, flexibility utilization also introduces new challenges to distribution system operators (DSOs), who need…

In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…

We study the problem of designing revenue-maximizing auctions for allocating multiple goods to flexible consumers. In our model, each consumer is interested in a subset of goods known as its flexibility set and wants to consume one good…

An optimal scheduling model for a microgrid participating in the electricity distribution market in interaction with a Distribution Market Operator (DMO) is proposed in this paper. The DMO administers the established electricity market in…

A novel distributed energy allocation mechanism for Distribution System Operator (DSO) market through a bi-level iterative auction is proposed. With the locational marginal price at the substation node known, the DSO runs an upper level…

This paper proposes a market clearing mechanism for energy trading in a local transactive market, where each player can participate in the market as seller or buyer and tries to maximize its welfare individually. Market players send their…

When agents with independent priors bid for a single item, Myerson's optimal auction maximizes expected revenue, whereas Vickrey's second-price auction optimizes social welfare. We address the natural question of trade-offs between the two…

In this paper we formulate the fixed budget resource allocation game to understand the performance of a distributed market-based resource allocation system. Multiple users decide how to distribute their budget (bids) among multiple machines…