相关论文: Proving SIFA Protection of Masked Redundant Circui…

While modern masking schemes provide provable security against passive side-channel analysis (SCA), such as power analysis, single faults can be employed to recover the secret key of ciphers even in masked implementations. In this paper, we…

Side-channel attacks, which are capable of breaking secrecy via side-channel information, pose a growing threat to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms. Masking is an effective countermeasure against side-channel attacks by…

Ineffective Fault Analysis (SIFA) was introduced as a new approach to attack block ciphers at CHES 2018. Since then, they have been proven to be a powerful class of attacks, with an easy to achieve fault model. One of the main benefits of…

Attackers increasingly, and with high success rates, use social engineering techniques to circumvent second factor authentication (2FA) technologies, compromise user accounts and sidestep fraud detection technologies. We introduce a social…

Power side-channel attacks, which can deduce secret data via statistical analysis, have become a serious threat. Masking is an effective countermeasure for reducing the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel…

Persistent Fault Attack (PFA) is a recently proposed Fault Attack (FA) method in CHES 2018. It is able to recover full AES secret key in the Single-Byte-Fault scenario. It is demonstrated that classical FA countermeasures, such as Dual…

Measuring the information leakage is critical for evaluating the practical security of cryptographic devices against side-channel analysis. Information-theoretic measures can be used (along with Fano's inequality) to derive upper bounds on…

The outsourcing of the design and manufacturing of integrated circuits has raised severe concerns about the piracy of Intellectual Properties and illegal overproduction. Logic locking has emerged as an obfuscation technique to protect…

Dynamic partial reconfiguration enables multi-tenancy in cloud-based FPGAs, which presents security challenges for tenants, IPs, and data. Malicious users can exploit FPGAs for remote side-channel attacks (SCAs), and shared on-chip…

Neural networks have been shown to be vulnerable against fault injection attacks. These attacks change the physical behavior of the device during the computation, resulting in a change of value that is currently being computed. They can be…

Verifying integrity of software execution in low-end micro-controller units (MCUs) is a well-known open problem. The central challenge is how to securely detect software exploits with minimal overhead, since these MCUs are designed for low…

Fault injection attacks (FIA) pose significant security threats to embedded systems as they exploit weaknesses across multiple layers, including system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical hardware.…

Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…

In recent years a new class of side-channel attacks has emerged. Instead of targeting device emissions during dynamic computation, adversaries now frequently exploit the leakage or response behaviour of integrated circuits in a static…

Since their introduction over two decades ago, side-channel attacks have presented a serious security threat. While many ciphers' implementations employ masking techniques to protect against such attacks, they often leak secret information…

Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by monitoring the power consumption. Since the emergence of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a major threat…

Embedded devices are increasingly present in our everyday life. They often process critical information, and hence, rely on cryptographic protocols to achieve security. However, embedded devices remain vulnerable to attackers seeking to…

Differential Power Analysis (DPA) has been an active area of research for the past two decades to study the attacks for extracting secret information from cryptographic implementations through power measurements and their defenses.…

This work presents a novel, black-box software-based countermeasure against physical attacks including power side-channel and fault-injection attacks. The approach uses the concept of random self-reducibility and self-correctness to add…

Memory corruption vulnerabilities are still a severe threat for software systems. To thwart the exploitation of such vulnerabilities, many different kinds of defenses have been proposed in the past. Most prominently, Control-Flow Integrity…