相关论文: Nonparametric inference on counterfactuals in firs…

This paper presents uniform estimation and inference theory for a large class of nonparametric partitioning-based M-estimators. The main theoretical results include: (i) uniform consistency for convex and non-convex objective functions;…

Setting an effective reserve price for strategic bidders in repeated auctions is a central question in online advertising. In this paper, we investigate how to set an anonymous reserve price in repeated auctions based on historical bids in…

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equilibria do not always exist in this model, however compelling…

We propose a uniform approach for the design and analysis of prior-free competitive auctions and online auctions. Our philosophy is to view the benchmark function as a variable parameter of the model and study a broad class of functions…

In uniform-price markets, suppliers compete to supply a resource to consumers, resulting in a single market price determined by their competition. For sufficient flexibility, producers and consumers prefer to commit to a function as their…

We consider regression models with parametric (linear or nonlinear) regression function and allow responses to be ``missing at random.'' We assume that the errors have mean zero and are independent of the covariates. In order to estimate…

We address the problem of improving bidders' strategies in prior-dependent revenue-maximizing auctions and introduce a simple and generic method to design novel bidding strategies if the seller uses past bids to optimize her mechanism. We…

We present an original theorem in auction theory: it specifies general conditions under which the sum of the payments of all bidders is necessarily not identically zero, and more generally not constant. Moreover, it explicitly supplies a…

In this paper, we consider a weighted local linear estimator based on the inverse selection probability for nonparametric regression with missing covariates at random. The asymptotic distribution of the maximal deviation between the…

In this paper, we develop a new and effective approach to nonparametric quantile regression that accommodates ultrahigh-dimensional data arising from spatio-temporal processes. This approach proves advantageous in staving off computational…

We consider the problem of learning optimal reserve price in repeated auctions against non-myopic bidders, who may bid strategically in order to gain in future rounds even if the single-round auctions are truthful. Previous algorithms,…

Budget-feasible procurement has been a major paradigm in mechanism design since its introduction by Singer (2010). An auctioneer (buyer) with a strict budget constraint is interested in buying goods or services from a group of strategic…

This work proposes a bid shading strategy for first-price auctions as a measure-valued optimization problem. We consider a standard parametric form for bid shading and formulate the problem as convex optimization over the joint distribution…

We propose a framework for analyzing the sensitivity of counterfactuals to parametric assumptions about the distribution of latent variables in structural models. In particular, we derive bounds on counterfactuals as the distribution of…

We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among buyers. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to the family of standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is…

Nonparametric estimation of the conditional expectation $E(Y | U)$ of an outcome $Y$ given a covariate vector $U$ is of primary importance in many statistical applications such as prediction and personalized medicine. In some problems,…

This paper studies Vickrey first-price auctions under binary feedback. Leveraging the enhanced performance of machine learning algorithms, the new algorithm uses past information to improve the regret bounds of the BROAD-OMD algorithm.…

Counterfactual inference aims to estimate the counterfactual outcome at the individual level given knowledge of an observed treatment and the factual outcome, with broad applications in fields such as epidemiology, econometrics, and…

We consider the problem of computing a (pure) Bayes-Nash equilibrium in the first-price auction with continuous value distributions and discrete bidding space. We prove that when bidders have independent subjective prior beliefs about the…

We study probabilistic single-item second-price auctions where the item is characterized by a set of attributes. The auctioneer knows the actual instantiation of all the attributes, but he may choose to reveal only a subset of these…