相关论文: Political Power and Market Power

This chapter examines the link between delegation and lobbying, two themes central to political economy. Delegation models explore how legislatures manage uncertainty and control bureaucratic agents, while lobbying models analyze how…

Comparing the results for preference attainment, self-perceived influence and reputational influence, this paper analyzes the relationship between financial resources and lobbying influence. The empirical analysis builds on data from an…

Labor unions influence economic outcomes not only through bargaining with employers over work contracts but also via political activities that can profoundly shape political systems. In unionized workplaces, they may mobilize and change the…

An increasing number of politicians are relying on cheaper, easier to access technologies such as online social media platforms to communicate with their constituency. These platforms present a cheap and low-barrier channel of communication…

In this paper, we investigate the interactions among oligarchs, political parties, and voters using an agent-based modeling approach. We introduce the OLIGO model, which is based on the spatial model of democracy, where voters have…

This paper derives a closed-form expression linking aggregate markups on imported inputs to concentration in a model of firm-to-firm trade with two-sided market power. Our theory extends standard oligopoly insights in two dimensions. First,…

Political polarization can be beneficial to competing political parties. I study how electoral competition itself generates incentives to polarize voters, even when parties are ex ante identical and motivated purely by political power,…

When a government makes many different policy decisions, lobbying can be viewed as a contest between the government and many different special interest groups. The government fights lobbying by interest groups with its own political…

This paper analyzes the strategic interactions between a profit-maximizing monopolist and a free, capacity-constrained public option. By restricting its own supply, the monopolist intentionally congests the public option and induces…

This paper investigates the extent of political rent seeking in Hungary in the 2010s. Political capitalism--where powerful private interests influence public policy for private gain--creates opportunities for rent seeking that vary across…

While lobbying has been demonstrated to have an important effect on public opinion and policy making, existing models of opinion formation do not specifically include its effect. In this work we introduce a new model of lobbying-driven…

This paper models firm-to-firm trade in a production network as a set of double auctions. Firms have multilateral market power, namely, can affect prices in both input and output markets. The size and division of surplus are endogenous and…

How much has market power increased in the United States in the last fifty years? And how did the rise in market power affect aggregate profits? Using micro-level data from U.S. Compustat, we find that several indicators of market power…

This paper examines the effect of ownership concentration on product position, product variety and readership in markets for daily newspapers. US antitrust policy presumes that mergers reduce the amount and diversity of content available to…

In this paper we study the impact of news media and public surveys on the electoral campaigns for political competitions. We present an agent-based model that addresses the effective influence of surveys in orienting the opinions of voters…

I characterize the consumer-optimal market segmentation in competitive markets where multiple firms selling differentiated products to consumers with unit demand. This segmentation is public---in that each firm observes the same market…

In recent years, the economic policy of privatization, which is defined as the transfer of property or responsibility from public sector to private sector, is one of the global phenomenon that increases use of markets to allocate resources.…

Classical spatial models predict platform convergence, yet empirical polarization persists. This paper proposes a non-electoral mechanism: lobbying as a monopsonistic market for legislative support. Here, extreme benefactors must pay more…

We study the growth dynamics of the size of manufacturing firms considering competition and normal distribution of competency. We start with the fact that all components of the system struggle with each other for growth as happened in real…

Antitrust authorities routinely rely on market concentration measures to assess the potential adverse effects of mergers on consumer welfare. Using a first-order approximation argument with logit and CES demand, I derive the relationship…