相关论文: Efficient Predictive Monitoring of Linear Time-Inv…
Stealthy attacks on Industrial Control Systems can cause significant damage while evading detection. In this paper, instead of focusing on the detection of stealthy attacks, we aim to provide early warnings to operators, in order to avoid…
As more attention is paid to security in the context of control systems and as attacks occur to real control systems throughout the world, it has become clear that some of the most nefarious attacks are those that evade detection. The term…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy false data injection attacks on sensors. We start by defining the stealthiness notion in the most general form where an attack is…
Stealthy sensor injection attacks are serious threats for industrial plants as they can compromise the plant's integrity without being detected by traditional fault detectors. In this manuscript, we study the possibility of revealing the…
We address the problem of state estimation, attack isolation, and control for discrete-time Linear Time Invariant (LTI) systems under (potentially unbounded) actuator false data injection attacks. Using a bank of Unknown Input Observers…
Industrial control systems (ICS), which in many cases are components of critical national infrastructure, are increasingly being connected to other networks and the wider internet motivated by factors such as enhanced operational…
Stealth attacks pose potential risks to cyber-physical systems because they are difficult to detect. Assessing the risk of systems under stealth attacks remains an open challenge, especially in nonlinear systems. To comprehensively quantify…
This paper investigates the online monitoring problem for cyber-physical systems under signal temporal logic (STL) specifications. The objective is to design an online monitor that evaluates system correctness at runtime based on partial…
SCADA protocols for Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are vulnerable to network attacks such as session hijacking. Hence, research focuses on network anomaly detection based on meta--data (message sizes, timing, command sequence), or on the…
The `security index' of a discrete-time LTI system under sensor attacks is introduced as a quantitative measure on the security of an observable system. We derive ideas from error control coding theory to provide sufficient conditions for…
Industrial control systems are critical to the operation of industrial facilities, especially for critical infrastructures, such as refineries, power grids, and transportation systems. Similar to other information systems, a significant…
Online monitoring aims to evaluate or to predict, at runtime, whether or not the behaviors of a system satisfy some desired specification. It plays a key role in safety-critical cyber-physical systems. In this work, we propose a new…
In this work, we focus on analyzing vulnerability of nonlinear dynamical control systems to stealthy sensor attacks. We start by defining the notion of stealthy attacks in the most general form by leveraging Neyman-Pearson lemma;…
We first develop systematic and comprehensive interval observer designs for linear time-invariant (LTI) systems, under standard assumptions of observability and interval bounds on the initial condition and uncertainties. Traditionally, such…
We study the optimal design of stealthy attacks against partially observed linear control systems. We first propose a novel likelihood-based detection mechanism derived from the innovation process, based on which we quantify stealthiness…
The increase in network connectivity has also resulted in several high-profile attacks on cyber-physical systems. An attacker that manages to access a local network could remotely affect control performance by tampering with sensor…
In this paper, we propose an effective and easily deployable approach to detect the presence of stealthy sensor attacks in industrial control systems, where (legacy) control devices critically rely on accurate (and usually non-encrypted)…
Online monitoring aims to evaluate or to predict, at runtime, whether or not the behaviors of a system satisfy some desired specification. It plays a key role in safety-critical cyber-physical systems. In this work, we propose a new…
We study the performance of perception-based control systems in the presence of attacks, and provide methods for modeling and analysis of their resiliency to stealthy attacks on both physical and perception-based sensing. Specifically, we…
Digital twins (DTs) are increasingly used to monitor and secure Industrial Control Systems (ICS), yet detecting stealthy False Data Injection Attacks (FDIAs) that manipulate system states within normal physical bounds remains challenging.…