相关论文: Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperatio…

Cooperation within asymmetric populations has garnered significant attention in evolutionary games. This paper explores cooperation evolution in populations with weak and strong players, using a game model where players choose between…

In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are…

Understanding the emergence and sustainability of cooperation is a fundamental problem in evolutionary biology and is frequently studied by the framework of evolutionary game theory. A very powerful mechanism to promote cooperation is…

Cooperation and competition coexist and coevolve in natural and social systems. Cooperation generates resources, which in turn, drive non-cooperative competition to secure individual shares. How this complex interplay between cooperation…

How cooperation evolves and particularly maintains at a large scale remains an open problem for improving humanity across domains ranging from climate change to pandemic response. To shed light on how behavioral norms can resolve the social…

The emergence of cooperation among self-interested agents has been a key concern of the multi-agent systems community for decades. With the increased importance of network-mediated interaction, researchers have shifted the attention on the…

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with…

Evolution of cooperation is a widely studied problem in biology, social science, economics, and artificial intelligence. Most of the existing approaches that explain cooperation rely on some notion of direct or indirect reciprocity. These…

We show how highly-diverse ecological communities may display persistent abundance fluctuations, when interacting through resource competition and subjected to migration from a species pool. This turns out to be closely related to the ratio…

Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…

Individuals might abstain from participating in an instance of an evolutionary game for various reasons, ranging from lack of interest to risk aversion. In order to understand the consequences of such diverse activity patterns on the…

Various theoretical and empirical studies have accounted for why humans cooperate in competitive environments. Although prior work has revealed that network structure and multiplex interactions can promote cooperation, most theory assumes…

We propose a model of emergence of cooperation in evolutionary games that high- lights the role of network formation and effect of network structure. In line with empirical data, the model proposes a mechanism that explains the persistence…

Cooperation is a difficult proposition in the face of Darwinian selection. Those that defect have an evolutionary advantage over cooperators who should therefore die out. However, spatial structure enables cooperators to survive through the…

An open problem in evolutionary game dynamics is to understand the effect of peer pressure on cooperation in a quantitative manner. Peer pressure can be modeled by punishment, which has been proved to be an effective mechanism to sustain…

We study the self-assembly of a complex network of collaborations among self-interested agents. The agents can maintain different levels of cooperation with different partners. Further, they continuously, selectively, and independently…

Here we study the effects of adopting different strategies against different opponent instead of adopting the same strategy against all of them in the prisoner dilemma structured in well-mixed populations. We consider an evolutionary…

In this paper we extend the investigation of cooperation in some classical evolutionary games on populations were the network of interactions among individuals is of the scale-free type. We show that the update rule, the payoff computation…

In society, mutual cooperation, defection, and asymmetric exploitative relationships are common. Whereas cooperation and defection are studied extensively in the literature on game theory, asymmetric exploitative relationships between…

Besides the structure of interactions within networks, also the interactions between networks are of the outmost importance. We therefore study the outcome of the public goods game on two interdependent networks that are connected by means…