相关论文: Kuhn's Equivalence Theorem for Games in Product Fo…

Extensive-form games are a common model for multiagent interactions with imperfect information. In two-player zero-sum games, the typical solution concept is a Nash equilibrium over the unconstrained strategy set for each player. In many…

This paper is concerned with complexity theoretic aspects of a general formulation of quantum game theory that models strategic interactions among rational agents that process and exchange quantum information. In particular, we prove that…

We introduce a new approach for computing optimal equilibria via learning in games. It applies to extensive-form settings with any number of players, including mechanism design, information design, and solution concepts such as correlated,…

For common notions of correlated equilibrium in extensive-form games, computing an optimal (e.g., welfare-maximizing) equilibrium is NP-hard. Other equilibrium notions -- communication (Forges 1986) and certification (Forges & Koessler…

Game semantics provides an interactive point of view on proofs, which enables one to describe precisely their dynamical behavior during cut elimination, by considering formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. We are specifically…

Strategic games admit a multi-graph representation, in which two kinds of relations, accessibility, and preferences, are used to describe how the players compare the possible outcomes. A category of games with a fixed set of players…

We study the long-term behavior of the fictitious play process in repeated extensive-form games of imperfect information with perfect recall. Each player maintains incorrect beliefs that the moves at all information sets, except the one at…

The famous theorem of R.Aumann and M.Maschler states that the sequence of values of an N-stage zero-sum game G_N with incomplete information on one side converges as N tends to infinity, and the error term is bounded by a constant divided…

In this paper, we investigate under which conditions normal-form games are (guaranteed to be) strategically equivalent. First, we show for N-player games (N >= 3) that (A) it is NP-hard to decide whether a given strategy is a best response…

Learning models do not in general imply that weakly dominated strategies are irrelevant or justify the related concept of "forward induction," because rational agents may use dominated strategies as experiments to learn how opponents play,…

For an arbitrary category, we consider the least class of functors con- taining the projections and closed under finite products, finite coproducts, parameterized initial algebras and parameterized final coalgebras, i.e. the class of…

In games with a large number of players where players may have overlapping objectives, the analysis of stable outcomes typically depends on player types. A special case is when a large part of the player population consists of imitation…

We introduce a framework for translating game descriptions in natural language into extensive-form representations in game theory, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and in-context learning. Given the varying levels of strategic…

We consider a dynamical approach to game in extensive forms. By restricting the convertibility relation over strategy profiles, we obtain a semi-potential (in the sense of Kukushkin), and we show that in finite games the corresponding…

In this paper we introduce the reactivity in decision-form games. The concept of reactivity allows us to give a natural concept of rationalizable solution for decision-form games: the solubility by elimination of sub-reactive strategies.…

We present a unifying representation of computation as a two-player game between an \emph{Algorithm} and \emph{Nature}, grounded in domain theory and game theory. The Algorithm produces progressively refined approximations within a Scott…

Normal-form proper equilibrium, introduced by Myerson as a refinement of normal-form perfect equilibrium, occupies a distinctive position in the equilibrium analysis of extensive-form games because its more stringent perturbation structure…

We present a consistent formulation of quantum game theory that accommodates all possible strategies in Hilbert space. The physical content of the quantum strategy is revealed as a family of classical games representing altruistic game play…

Heifetz, Meier, and Schipper (2013) introduced dynamic game with unawareness consisting of a partially ordered set of games in extensive form. Here, we study the normal form of dynamic games with unawareness. The generalized normal form…

We propose a quantum-like description of markets and economics. The approach has roots in the recently developed quantum game theory.