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Most electronic devices utilize mechanical keyboards to receive inputs, including sensitive information such as authentication credentials, personal and private data, emails, plans, etc. However, these systems are susceptible to acoustic…
Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip…
Smartwatches enable many novel applications and are fast gaining popularity. However, the presence of a diverse set of on-board sensors provides an additional attack surface to malicious software and services on these devices. In this…
Recent studies have shown that aggregate CPU usage and power consumption traces on smartphones can leak information about applications running on the system or websites visited. In response, access to such data has been blocked for mobile…
The widespread accessibility and ease of use of additive manufacturing (AM), widely recognized as 3D printing, has put Intellectual Property (IP) at great risk of theft. As 3D printers emit acoustic and magnetic signals while printing, the…
Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar…
In this paper, we present the actual risks of stealing user PINs by using mobile sensors versus the perceived risks by users. First, we propose PINlogger.js which is a JavaScript-based side channel attack revealing user PINs on an Android…
This paper shows that today's wireless charging interface is vulnerable to power side-channel attacks; a smartphone charging wirelessly leaks private information about its activity to the wireless charger (charging transmitter). We present…
We present the first acoustic side-channel attack that recovers what users type on the virtual keyboard of their touch-screen smartphone or tablet. When a user taps the screen with a finger, the tap generates a sound wave that propagates on…
In this paper, we propose a new type of side channel which is based on the ambient-light sensor employed in today's mobile devices. The pervasive usage of mobile devices, i.e., smartphones and tablet computers and their vast amount of…
Nowadays smartphones come embedded with multiple motion sensors, such as an accelerometer, a gyroscope and an orientation sensor. With these sensors, apps can gather more information and therefore provide end users with more functionality.…
Side-channel attacks that leak sensitive information through a computing device's interaction with its physical environment have proven to be a severe threat to devices' security, particularly when adversaries have unfettered physical…
Side-channel attacks exploit variations in non-functional behaviors to expose sensitive information across security boundaries. Existing methods leverage side-channels based on power consumption, electromagnetic radiation, silicon substrate…
Online handwriting recognition has been studied for a long time with only few practicable results when writing on normal paper. Previous approaches using sensor-based devices encountered problems that limited the usage of the developed…
We report the first active acoustic side-channel attack. Speakers are used to emit human inaudible acoustic signals and the echo is recorded via microphones, turning the acoustic system of a smart phone into a sonar system. The echo signal…
Side-channel attacks on mobile devices have gained increasing attention since their introduction in 2007. While traditional side-channel attacks, such as power analysis attacks and electromagnetic analysis attacks, required physical…
In recent years fingerprinting of various physical and logical devices has been proposed with the goal of uniquely identifying users or devices of mainstream IT systems such as PCs, Laptops and smart phones. On the other hand, the…
Industrial Control Systems are under increased scrutiny. Their security is historically sub-par, and although measures are being taken by the manufacturers to remedy this, the large installed base of legacy systems cannot easily be updated…
In this paper, we propose an effective and easily deployable approach to detect the presence of stealthy sensor attacks in industrial control systems, where (legacy) control devices critically rely on accurate (and usually non-encrypted)…