相关论文: The Secretary Problem with Distributions
The chore division problem simulates the fair division of a heterogeneous, undesirable resource among several agents. In the fair division of chores, each agent only gets the disutility from its own piece. Agents may, however, also be…
In the Matroid Secretary Problem, introduced by Babaioff et al. [SODA 2007], the elements of a given matroid are presented to an online algorithm in random order. When an element is revealed, the algorithm learns its weight and decides…
The Matroid Secretary Problem is a central question in online optimization, modeling sequential decision-making under combinatorial constraints. We introduce a bipartite graph framework that unifies and extends several known formulations,…
We show that outliers occur almost surely in computable dynamics over infinite sequences. Ever greater outliers can be found as the number of visited states increases. We show the Independence Postulate explains how outliers are found in…
Agents receive private signals about an unknown state. The resulting joint belief distributions are complex and lack a simple characterization. Our key insight is that, when conditioned on the state, the structure of belief distributions…
We consider a population of Bayesian agents who share a common prior over some finite state space and each agent is exposed to some information about the state. We ask which distributions over empirical distributions of posteriors beliefs…
A set of objects is to be divided fairly among agents with different tastes, modeled by additive utility-functions. If we consider the objects as indivisible, many instances of the decision problem: ``Is there a fair division of the objects…
A matroid $\mathcal{M}$ on a set $E$ of elements has the $\alpha$-partition property, for some $\alpha>0$, if it is possible to (randomly) construct a partition matroid $\mathcal{P}$ on (a subset of) elements of $\mathcal{M}$ such that…
We study online combinatorial allocation problems in the secretary setting, under interdependent values. In the interdependent model, introduced by Milgrom and Weber (1982), each agent possesses a private signal that captures her…
We prove an existence result for the principal-agent problem with adverse selection under general assumptions on preferences and allocation spaces. Instead of assuming that the allocation space is finite-dimensional or compact, we consider…
This paper considers a variation of the full-information secretary problem where the random variables to be observed are independent but not necessary identically distributed. The main result is a sharp lower bound for the optimal win…
Motivated by the common academic problem of allocating papers to referees for conference reviewing we propose a novel mechanism for solving the assignment problem when we have a two sided matching problem with preferences from one side (the…
Ad hoc teamwork is the research problem of designing agents that can collaborate with new teammates without prior coordination. This survey makes a two-fold contribution: First, it provides a structured description of the different facets…
We consider the following control problem on fair allocation of indivisible goods. Given a set $I$ of items and a set of agents, each having strict linear preference over the items, we ask for a minimum subset of the items whose deletion…
In a delegation problem, a principal P with commitment power tries to pick one out of $n$ options. Each option is drawn independently from a known distribution. Instead of inspecting the options herself, P delegates the information…
The J-choice K-best secretary problem, also known as the (J,K)-secretary problem, is a generalization of the classical secretary problem. An algorithm for the (J,K)-secretary problem is allowed to make J choices and the payoff to be…
Consider $n$ players whose "scores" are independent and identically distributed values $\{X_i\}_{i=1}^n$ from some discrete distribution $F$. We pay special attention to the cases where (i) $F$ is geometric with parameter $p\to0$ and (ii)…
We initiate the study of bribery problem in the context of gerrymandering and reverse gerrymandering. In our most general problem, the input is a set of voters having votes over a set of alternatives, a graph on the voters, a partition of…
Can stated preferences inform counterfactual analyses of actual choice? This research proposes a novel approach to researchers who have access to both stated choices in hypothetical scenarios and actual choices, matched or unmatched. The…
In a recent paper, Aldous, Blanc and Curien asked which distributions can be expressed as the distance between two independent random variables on some separable measured metric space. We show that every nonnegative discrete distribution…