相关论文: Evolution of Risk-Taking Behaviour and Status Pref…

Cooperation is a key driver of human social progress. Studies of the evolution of cooperation typically assume a deterministic outcome for social interactions. But in real-world social interactions, interaction outcomes are often subject to…

Interactions between people are the basis on which the structure of our society arises as a complex system and, at the same time, are the starting point of any physical description of it. In the last few years, much theoretical research has…

Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…

Coordination games describe social or economic interactions in which the adoption of a common strategy has a higher payoff. They are classically used to model the spread of conventions, behaviors, and technologies in societies. Here we…

Addressing the question of how to achieve optimal decision-making under risk and uncertainty is crucial for enhancing the capabilities of artificial agents that collaborate with or support humans. In this work, we address this question in…

Cooperative dynamics are central to our understanding of many phenomena in living and complex systems. However, we lack a universal mechanism to explain the emergence of cooperation. We present a novel framework for modelling social dilemma…

Addressing both natural and societal challenges requires collective cooperation. Studies on collective-risk social dilemmas have shown that individual decisions are influenced by the perceived risk of collective failure. However, existing…

Tolerance implies enduring trying circumstances with a fair and objective attitude. To determine whether evolutionary advantages might be stemming from diverse levels of tolerance in a population, we study a spatial public goods game, where…

Human behavioural patterns exhibit selfish or competitive, as well as selfless or altruistic tendencies, both of which have demonstrable effects on human social and economic activity. In behavioural economics, such effects have…

This paper studies two important signal processing aspects of equilibrium behavior in non-cooperative games arising in social networks, namely, reinforcement learning and detection of equilibrium play. The first part of the paper presents a…

We use the indirect evolutionary approach to study evolutionarily stable preferences against multiple mutations in single- and multi-population matching settings, respectively. Players choose strategies to maximize their subjective…

Evolutionary game theory assumes that individuals maximize their benefits when choosing strategies. However, an alternative perspective proposes that individuals seek to maximize the benefits of others. To explore the relationship between…

We study a model in which two players with opposing interests try to alter a status quo through instability-generating actions. We show that instability can be used to secure longer-term durable changes, even if it is costly to generate and…

We introduce a way to compare actions in decision problems. One action is safer than another if the set of beliefs at which the decision-maker prefers the safer action expands as the decision-maker becomes more risk averse. We provide a…

We deal with coalitional games possessing strictly positive values. Individually rational allocations of such a game has clear fractional interpretations. Many concepts, including the long-existing core and other stability notions more…

We study the equilibrium behavior in a multi-commodity selfish routing game with many types of uncertain users where each user over- or under-estimates their congestion costs by a multiplicative factor. Surprisingly, we find that…

Why do maladaptive perceptions and norms, such as zero-sum interpretations of interaction, persist even when they undermine cooperation and investment? We develop a framework where bounded rationality and heterogeneous cognitive biases…

This paper proposes a model to explain the potential role of inter-group conflicts in determining the rise and fall of signaling norms. Individuals in a population are characterized by high and low productivity types and they are matched in…

This paper investigates the evolution of strategic play where players drawn from a finite well-mixed population are offered the opportunity to play in a public goods game. All players accept the offer. However, due to the possibility of…

This study investigates the effect of behavioral mistakes on the evolutionary stability of the cooperative equilibrium in a repeated public goods game. Many studies show that behavioral mistakes have detrimental effects on cooperation…