相关论文: Strategy-proof and Envy-free Mechanisms for House …

We study the existence of allocations of indivisible goods that are envy-free up to one good (EF1), under the additional constraint that each bundle needs to be connected in an underlying item graph. If the graph is a path and the utility…

For the assignment problem where multiple indivisible items are allocated to a group of agents given their ordinal preferences, we design randomized mechanisms that satisfy first-choice maximality (FCM), i.e., maximizing the number of…

Explore-and-exploit tradeoffs play a key role in recommendation systems (RSs), aiming at serving users better by learning from previous interactions. Despite their commercial success, the societal effects of explore-and-exploit mechanisms…

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a mechanism is partially strategyproof if it makes truthful…

We study the problem of allocating multiple objects to agents without transferable utilities, where each agent may receive more than one object according to a quota. Under lexicographic preferences, we characterize the set of strategyproof,…

We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…

We consider the problem of fair allocation of indivisible chores under additive valuations. We assume that the chores are divided into two types and under this scenario, we present several results. Our first result is a new characterization…

In the assignment problem, the goal is to assign indivisible items to agents who have ordinal preferences, efficiently and fairly, in a strategyproof manner. In practice, first-choice maximality, i.e., assigning a maximal number of agents…

We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible items for groups of agents from the perspectives of the agents and a centralized allocator. In our setting, the centralized allocator is interested in ensuring the allocation is fair among the…

We investigate the query complexity of the fair allocation of indivisible goods. For two agents with arbitrary monotonic utilities, we design an algorithm that computes an allocation satisfying envy-freeness up to one good (EF1), a…

We investigate the fair allocation of indivisible goods to agents with possibly different entitlements represented by weights. Previous work has shown that guarantees for additive valuations with existing envy-based notions cannot be…

We study the fair allocation of indivisible goods under cardinality constraints, where each agent must receive a bundle of fixed size. This models practical scenarios, such as assigning shifts or forming equally sized teams. Recently,…

A well-regarded fairness notion when dividing indivisible chores is envy-freeness up to one item (EF1), which requires that pairwise envy can be eliminated by the removal of a single item. While an EF1 and Pareto optimal (PO) allocation of…

In many applications such as rationing medical care and supplies, university admissions, and the assignment of public housing, the decision of who receives an allocation can be justified by various normative criteria. Such settings have…

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a set of indivisible goods to a set of strategic agents with additive valuation functions. We assume no monetary transfers and, therefore, a mechanism in our setting is an algorithm that takes as…

We consider the problem of allocating heterogeneous and indivisible goods among strategic agents, with preferences over subsets of goods, when there is no medium of exchange. This model captures the well studied problem of fair allocation…

We consider a practically motivated variant of the canonical online fair allocation problem: a decision-maker has a budget of perishable resources to allocate over a fixed number of rounds. Each round sees a random number of arrivals, and…

We study a fair resource scheduling problem, where a set of interval jobs are to be allocated to heterogeneous machines controlled by agents. Each job is associated with release time, deadline, and processing time such that it can be…

Fair allocation of indivisible goods is a well-explored problem. Traditionally, research focused on individual fairness - are individual agents satisfied with their allotted share? - and group fairness - are groups of agents treated fairly?…