相关论文: Speculative Leakage in ARM Cortex-A53

Fault injection attacks exploit physical disturbances to compromise the functionality and security of integrated circuits. As System on Chip (SoC) architectures grow in complexity, the vulnerability of on chip communication fabrics has…

SpecFuzz is the first tool that enables dynamic testing for speculative execution vulnerabilities (e.g., Spectre). The key is a novel concept of speculation exposure: The program is instrumented to simulate speculative execution in software…

This paper introduces Triosecuris, a formally verified defense against Spectre BTB, RSB, and PHT that combines CET-style hardware-assisted control-flow integrity with compiler-inserted speculative load hardening (SLH). Triosecuris is based…

Recent research has revealed an ever-growing class of microarchitectural attacks that exploit speculative execution, a standard feature in modern processors. Proposed and deployed countermeasures involve a variety of compiler updates,…

Due to their proven efficiency, machine-learning systems are deployed in a wide range of complex real-life problems. More specifically, Spiking Neural Networks (SNNs) emerged as a promising solution to the accuracy, resource-utilization,…

Machine learning models are increasingly used for software security tasks. These models are commonly trained and evaluated on large Internet-derived datasets, which often contain duplicated or highly similar samples. When such samples are…

We present a novel mechanism to construct a covert channel based on page faults. A page fault is an event that occurs when a process or a thread tries to access a page of memory that is not currently mapped to its address space. The kernel…

Memory disclosure attacks play an important role in the exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities. By analyzing recent research, we observe that bypasses of defensive solutions that enforce control-flow integrity or attempt to…

Prompt leakage poses a compelling security and privacy threat in LLM applications. Leakage of system prompts may compromise intellectual property, and act as adversarial reconnaissance for an attacker. A systematic evaluation of prompt…

The run-time electromagnetic (EM) emanation of microprocessors presents a side-channel that leaks the confidentiality of the applications running on them. Many recent works have demonstrated successful attacks leveraging such side-channels…

The security of computer systems fundamentally relies on memory isolation, e.g., kernel address ranges are marked as non-accessible and are protected from user access. In this paper, we present Meltdown. Meltdown exploits side effects of…

Spiking neural networks coupled with neuromorphic hardware and event-based sensors are getting increased interest for low-latency and low-power inference at the edge. However, multiple spiking neuron models have been proposed in the…

Time variation during program execution can leak sensitive information. Time variations due to program control flow and hardware resource contention have been used to steal encryption keys in cipher implementations such as AES and RSA. A…

In this paper we analyze the MPI-only version of the CloverLeaf code from the SPEChpc 2021 benchmark suite on recent Intel Xeon "Ice Lake" and "Sapphire Rapids" server CPUs. We observe peculiar breakdowns in performance when the number of…

Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) are integrated circuits that implement reconfigurable hardware. They are used in modern systems, creating specialized, highly-optimized integrated circuits without the need to design and manufacture…

Substring-searchable symmetric encryption (substring-SSE) has become increasingly critical for privacy-preserving applications in cloud systems. However, existing schemes remain vulnerable to information leakage during search operations,…

The pursuit of power-efficiency is popularizing asymmetric multicore processors (AMP) such as ARM big.LITTLE, Apple M1 and recent Intel Alder Lake with big and little cores. However, we find that existing scalable locks fail to scale on AMP…

In this paper we show how attackers can covertly leak data (e.g., encryption keys, passwords and files) from highly secure or air-gapped networks via the row of status LEDs that exists in networking equipment such as LAN switches and…

Existing logic-locking attacks are known to successfully decrypt functionally correct key of a locked combinational circuit. It is possible to extend these attacks to real-world Silicon-based Intellectual Properties (IPs, which are…

Transient Execution Attacks (TEAs) have gradually become a major security threat to modern high-performance processors. They exploit the vulnerability of speculative execution to illegally access private data, and transmit them through…