相关论文: AiR-ViBeR: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Compu…
Electromagnetic (EM) covert channels pose significant threats to computer and communications security in air-gapped networks. Previous works exploit EM radiation from various components (e.g., video cables, memory buses, CPUs) to secretly…
Eavesdropping from the user's smartphone is a well-known threat to the user's safety and privacy. Existing studies show that loudspeaker reverberation can inject speech into motion sensor readings, leading to speech eavesdropping. While…
We note that constituent fields (notably the fraction-of-seconds timestamp field) in the data payload structure of the synchrophasor communication protocol (IEEE C37.118 standard) are overprovisioned relative to real-world usage and needs,…
This paper introduces a new type of attack on isolated, air-gapped workstations. Although air-gap computers have no wireless connectivity, we show that attackers can use the SATA cable as a wireless antenna to transfer radio signals at the…
Analogously to classical computers, quantum processors exhibit side channels that may give attackers access to potentially proprietary algorithms. We identify and exploit a previously unexplored side channel in trapped-ion quantum…
AI models are often regarded as valuable intellectual property due to the high cost of their development, the competitive advantage they provide, and the proprietary techniques involved in their creation. As a result, AI model stealing…
In this paper, we present an acoustic side channel attack which makes use of smartphone microphones recording a robot in operation to exploit acoustic properties of the sound to fingerprint a robot's movements. In this work we consider the…
Most modern smartphones are equipped with a barometer to sample air pressure. Accessing these samples is deemed harmless, hence does not require any permission. In this work, we show, however, that these samples can reveal sensitive…
Smartphone motion sensors provide a concealed mechanism for eavesdropping on acoustic information, like touchtones, emitted by a device. Eavesdropping on touchtones exposes credit card information, banking pins, and social security card…
Wireless covert channels promise to exfiltrate information with high bandwidth by circumventing traditional access control mechanisms. Ideally, they are only accessible by the intended recipient and---for regular system…
A whole range of attacks becomes possible when adversaries gain physical access to computing systems that process or contain sensitive data. Examples include side-channel analysis, bus probing, device cloning, or implanting hardware…
Acoustic Side-Channel Attacks (ASCAs) extract sensitive information by using audio emitted from a computing devices and their peripherals. Attacks targeting keyboards are popular and have been explored in the literature. However, similar…
By moving from massive antennas to antenna surfaces for software-defined wireless systems, the reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs) rely on arrays of unit cells to control the scattering and reflection profiles of signals, mitigating…
More and more people are regularly using mobile and battery-powered handsets, such as smartphones and tablets. At the same time, thanks to the technological innovation and to the high user demands, those devices are integrating extensive…
Covert channels enable information leakage across security boundaries of the operating system. Microarchitectural covert channels exploit changes in execution timing resulting from competing access to limited hardware resources. We use the…
Using floor vibrations to accurately predict occupants' footstep locations is essential for smart building operation and privacy-preserving indoor sensing. However, existing approaches are dominated by either physics-based models that rely…
Recognizing surfaces based on their vibration signatures is useful as it can enable tagging of different locations without requiring any additional hardware such as Near Field Communication (NFC) tags. However, previous vibration based…
The light-emitting diode(LED) is widely used as an indicator on the information device. Early in 2002, Loughry et al studied the exfiltration of LED indicators and found the kind of LEDs unmodulated to indicate some state of the device can…
Covert channels are communication channels used by attackers to transmit information from a compromised system when the access control policy of the system does not allow doing so. Previous work has shown that CPU frequency scaling can be…
A myriad of IoT devices such as bulbs, switches, speakers in a smart home environment allow users to easily control the physical world around them and facilitate their living styles through the sensors already embedded in these devices.…