相关论文: Sunspot Equilibrium in Positive Recursive Two-Dime…

Control problems not admitting the dynamic programming principle are known as time-inconsistent. The game-theoretic approach is to interpret such problems as intrapersonal dynamic games and look for subgame perfect Nash equilibria. A…

We study a repeated game with payoff externalities and observable actions where two players receive information over time about an underlying payoff-relevant state, and strategically coordinate their actions. Players learn about the true…

We study a dynamic game with a large population of players who choose actions from a finite set in continuous time. Each player has a state in a finite state space that evolves stochastically with their actions. A player's reward depends…

Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…

Real world applications such as economics and policy making often involve solving multi-agent games with two unique features: (1) The agents are inherently asymmetric and partitioned into leaders and followers; (2) The agents have different…

The paper is concerned with two-person games with saddle point. We investigate the limits of value functions for long-time-average payoff, discounted average payoff, and the payoff that follows a probability density. Most of our assumptions…

Many interactions result in a socially suboptimal equilibrium, or in a non-equilibrium state, from which arriving at an equilibrium through simple dynamics can be impossible of too long. Aiming to achieve a certain equilibrium, we persuade,…

In a probabilistic mean-field game driven by a linear diffusion an individual player aims to minimize an ergodic long-run cost by controlling the diffusion through a pair of -- increasing and decreasing -- c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…

This paper examines the convergence behaviour of simultaneous best-response dynamics in random potential games. We provide a theoretical result showing that, for two-player games with sufficiently many actions, the dynamics converge quickly…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

We define and analyze the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium for nonatomic aggregative games with an infinity of players types. These equilibria are characterized through an infinite-dimensional variational inequality. We show, under…

In this paper, we study the number of equilibria of the replicator-mutator dynamics for both deterministic and random multi-player two-strategy evolutionary games. For deterministic games, using Decartes' rule of signs, we provide a formula…

A notion of pi-tolerant equilibrium is defined that takes into account that players have some tolerance regarding payoffs in a game. This solution concept generalizes Nash and refines epsilon-Nash equilibrium in a natural way. We show that…

Coordination games admit two types of equilibria: pure equilibria, where all players successfully coordinate their actions, and mixed equilibria, where players frequently experience miscoordination. The existing literature shows that under…

Uniform substitution of function, predicate, program or game symbols is the core operation in parsimonious provers for hybrid systems and hybrid games. By postponing soundness-critical admissibility checks, this paper introduces a uniform…

Learning in zero-sum games studies a situation where multiple agents competitively learn their strategy. In such multi-agent learning, we often see that the strategies cycle around their optimum, i.e., Nash equilibrium. When a game…

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are played in a homogeneous population where all individuals are…

Evidence games study situations where a sender persuades a receiver by selectively disclosing hard evidence about an unknown state of the world. Evidence games often have multiple equilibria. Hart et al. (2017) propose to focus on…

Evolution of agents' dynamics of multiagent systems under consensus protocol in the face of jamming attacks is discussed, where centralized parties are able to influence the control signals of the agents. In this paper we focus on a…

We examine the reversible adsorption of spherical solutes on a random site surface in which the adsorption sites are uniformly and randomly distributed on a substrate. Each site can be occupied by one solute provided that the nearest…