相关论文: Analysis of Moving Target Defense Against False Da…

Recently, moving target defence (MTD) has been proposed to thwart false data injection (FDI) attacks in power system state estimation by proactively triggering the distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. One of the…

We study moving-target defense (MTD) that actively perturbs transmission line reactances to thwart stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks against state estimation in a power grid. Prior work on this topic has proposed MTD based on…

Machine learning (ML)-based detectors have been shown to be effective in detecting stealthy false data injection attacks (FDIAs) that can bypass conventional bad data detectors (BDDs) in power systems. However, ML models are also vulnerable…

Data injection attacks (DIAs) pose a significant cybersecurity threat to the Smart Grid by enabling an attacker to compromise the integrity of data acquisition and manipulate estimated states without triggering bad data detection…

In recent studies, moving target defense (MTD) has been applied to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks using distributed flexible AC transmission system (D-FACTS) devices. However, the inherent conflict between the security goals of…

Moving target defense (MTD) in power grids is an emerging defense technique that has gained prominence in the recent past. It aims to solve the long-standing problem of securing the power grid against stealthy attacks. The key idea behind…

This paper examines how moving target defences (MTD) implemented in power systems can be countered by unsupervised learning-based false data injection (FDI) attack and how MTD can be combined with physical watermarking to enhance the system…

Fast and accurate detection of cyberattacks is a key element for a cyber-resilient power system. Recently, data-driven detectors and physics-based Moving Target Defences (MTD) have been proposed to detect false data injection (FDI) attacks…

Moving target defenses (MTD) are proactive security techniques that enhance network security by confusing the attacker and limiting their attack window. MTDs have been shown to have significant benefits when evaluated against traditional…

Electric power grid components, such as high voltage transformers (HVTs), generating stations, substations, etc. are expensive to maintain and, in the event of failure, replace. Thus, regularly monitoring the behavior of such components is…

This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. A CCPA consists of a physical attack, such as disconnecting a transmission line, followed by a coordinated…

This work proposes a moving target defense (MTD) strategy to detect coordinated cyber-physical attacks (CCPAs) against power grids. The main idea of the proposed approach is to invalidate the knowledge that the attackers use to mask the…

We address the problem of constructing false data injection (FDI) attacks that can bypass the bad data detector (BDD) of a power grid. The attacker is assumed to have access to only power flow measurement data traces (collected over a…

Network defenses based on traditional tools, techniques, and procedures fail to account for the attacker's inherent advantage present due to the static nature of network services and configurations. To take away this asymmetric advantage,…

This paper outlines a cyber-physical authentication strategy to protect power system infrastructure against false data injection (FDI) attacks. We demonstrate that it is feasible to use small, low-cost, yet highly attack-resistant security…

In this paper a new class of cyber attacks against state estimation in the electric power grid is considered. This class of attacks is named false data injection attacks. We show that with the knowledge of the system configuration an…

Several moving target defenses (MTDs) to counter adversarial ML attacks have been proposed in recent years. MTDs claim to increase the difficulty for the attacker in conducting attacks by regularly changing certain elements of the defense,…

Small-Signal Stability (SSS) is crucial for the control of power grids. However, False Data Injection (FDI) attacks against SSS can impact the grid stability, hence, the security of SSS needs to be studied. This paper proposes a formal…

Accurate state estimation is of paramount importance to maintain the power system operating in a secure and efficient state. The recently identified coordinated data injection attacks to meter measurements can bypass the current security…

Modern urban railways extensively use computerized sensing and control technologies to achieve safe, reliable, and well-timed operations. However, the use of these technologies may provide a convenient leverage to cyber-attackers who have…