相关论文: Systemic risk and network intervention

This paper studies a special kind of equilibrium termed as "balanced equilibrium" which arises in the power allocation game defined in \cite{allocation}. In equilibrium, each country in antagonism has to use all of its own power to…

Inspired by scenarios where the strategic network design and defense or immunisation are of the central importance, Goyal et al. [3] defined a new Network Formation Game with Attack and Immunisation. The authors showed that despite the…

We undertake a fundamental study of network equilibria modeled as solutions of fixed point equations for monotone linear functions with saturation nonlinearities. The considered model extends one originally proposed to study systemic risk…

This article studies a problem of strategic network inspection, in which a defender (agency) is tasked with detecting the presence of multiple attacks in the network. An inspection strategy entails monitoring the network components,…

In this work, we provide a structural characterization of the possible Nash equilibria in the well-studied class of security games with additive utility. Our analysis yields a classification of possible equilibria into seven types and we…

In this work, we consider two types of adversarial attacks on a network of nodes seeking to reach consensus. The first type involves an adversary that is capable of breaking a specific number of links at each time instant. In the second…

We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The goal of the network designer is to assist the nodes reach…

We consider a strategic network monitoring problem involving the operator of a networked system and an attacker. The operator aims to randomize the placement of multiple protected sensors to monitor and protect components that are…

Cybersecurity risk analysis plays an essential role in supporting organizations make effective decision about how to manage and control cybersecurity risk. Cybersecurity risk is a function of the interplay between the defender, i.e., the…

We provide a framework for detecting relevant insurance companies in a systemic risk perspective. Among the alternative methodologies for measuring systemic risk, we propose a complex network approach where insurers are linked to form a…

Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal…

In this work, we introduce a game-theoretic model that assesses the cyber-security risk of cloud networks and informs security experts on the optimal security strategies. Our approach combines game theory, combinatorial optimization, and…

The recent advancement in real-world critical infrastructure networks has led to an exponential growth in the use of automated devices which in turn has created new security challenges. In this paper, we study the robust and adaptive…

Due to the importance of robustness in many real-world optimization problems, the field of robust optimization has gained a lot of attention over the past decade. We concentrate on maximum flow problems and introduce a novel robust…

We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…

We analyze the robustness of (pure strategy) Nash equilibria for network games against perturbations of the players' utility functions. We first derive a simple characterization of the margin of robustness, defined as the minimum magnitude…

We study the interaction between a network designer and an adversary over a dynamical network. The network consists of nodes performing continuous-time distributed averaging. The adversary strategically disconnects a set of links to prevent…

In this paper, we investigate game-theoretic strategies for containing spreading processes on large-scale networks. Specifically, we consider the class of networked susceptible-infected-susceptible (SIS) epidemics where a large population…

A cyber security problem in a networked system formulated as a resilient graph problem based on a game-theoretic approach is considered. The connectivity of the underlying graph of the network system is reduced by an attacker who removes…

The recently developed mean-field game models of corruption and bot-net defence in cyber-security, the evolutionary game approach to inspection and corruption, and the pressure-resistance game element, can be combined under an extended…