相关论文: Duty to Warn in Strategic Games

This paper presents the research on the interdisciplinary research infrastructure for understanding human reasoning in game-theoretic terms. Strategic reasoning is considered to impact human decision making in social, economical and…

Explainability plays an increasingly important role in machine learning. Furthermore, humans view the world through a causal lens and thus prefer causal explanations over associational ones. Therefore, in this paper, we develop a causal…

We study the underlying mathematical properties of various partial order models of concurrency based on transition systems, Petri nets, and event structures, and show that the concurrent behaviour of these systems can be captured in a…

This paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over agent strategies. Unlike previous work on alternating temporal epistemic logic, the semantics works with systems whose states explicitly encode…

We introduce the class of pay or play games, which captures scenarios in which each decision maker is faced with a choice between two actions: one with a fixed payoff and an- other with a payoff dependent on others' selected actions. This…

The concept of power among players can be expressed as a combination of their utilities. A player who obeys another takes into account the utility of the dominant one. Technically it is a matter of superimposing some weighted sum or product…

We study a communication game between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with repeated interactions and voluntary transfers. Transfers motivate the receiver's decision-making and signal the sender's information. Although full…

Game semantics describe the interactive behavior of proofs by interpreting formulas as games on which proofs induce strategies. Such a semantics is introduced here for capturing dependencies induced by quantifications in first-order…

Research in cooperative games often assumes that agents know the coalitional values with certainty, and that they can belong to one coalition only. By contrast, this work assumes that the value of a coalition is based on an underlying…

Dynamic epistemic logics which model abilities of agents to make various announcements and influence each other's knowledge have been studied extensively in recent years. Two notable examples of such logics are Group Announcement Logic and…

Formal verification of strategic abilities is a hard problem. We propose to use the methodology of assume-guarantee reasoning in order to facilitate model checking of alternating-time temporal logic with imperfect information and imperfect…

In many machine learning applications, there are multiple decision-makers involved, both automated and human. The interaction between these agents often goes unaddressed in algorithmic development. In this work, we explore a simple version…

Humans judge each other's actions, which at least partly functions to detect and deter cheating and to enable helpfulness in an indirect reciprocity fashion. However, most forms of judging do not only concern the action itself, but also the…

In this paper, we investigate informational asymmetries in the Colonel Blotto game, a game-theoretic model of competitive resource allocation between two players over a set of battlefields. The battlefield valuations are subject to…

Our ability to control complex systems is a fundamental challenge of contemporary science. Recently introduced tools to identify the driver nodes, nodes through which we can achieve full control, predict the existence of multiple control…

The rationalizability concept was introduced in \cite{Ber84} and \cite{Pea84} to assess what can be inferred by rational players in a non-cooperative game in the presence of common knowledge. However, this notion can be defined in a number…

Many real-world multi-agent interactions consider multiple distinct criteria, i.e. the payoffs are multi-objective in nature. However, the same multi-objective payoff vector may lead to different utilities for each participant. Therefore,…

Optimal behavior in (competitive) situation is traditionally determined with the help of utility functions that measure the payoff of different actions. Given an ordering on the space of revenues (payoffs), the classical axiomatic approach…

We consider an extension of strategic normal form games with a phase before the actual play of the game, where players can make binding offers for transfer of utilities to other players after the play of the game, contingent on the…

A large body of empirical evidence suggests that humans are willing to engage in costly punishment of defectors in public goods games. Based on such pieces of evidence, it is suggested that punishment serves an important role in promoting…