相关论文: Duty to Warn in Strategic Games

We present a model that takes into account the coupling between evolutionary game dynamics and social influence. Importantly, social influence and game dynamics take place in different domains, which we model as different layers of a…

Collaboration is an integral part of human dialogue. Typical task-oriented dialogue games assign asymmetric roles to the participants, which limits their ability to elicit naturalistic role-taking in collaboration and its negotiation. We…

In this briefing report, we introduce a new concept (war algorithms) that elevates algorithmically-derived choices and decisions to a, and perhaps the, central concern regarding technical autonomy in war. We thereby aim to shed light on and…

The study of group knowledge concepts such as mutual, common, and distributed knowledge is well established within the discipline of epistemic logic. In this work, we incorporate epistemic abilities of agents to refine the formal definition…

In classical game theory, optimal strategies are determined for games with complete information; this requires knowledge of the opponent's goals. We analyze games when a player is mistaken about their opponents goals. For definitiveness, we…

In this paper we address the cooperation problem in structured populations by considering the prisoner's dilemma game as metaphor of the social interactions between individuals with imitation capacity. We present a new strategy update rule…

We study a Bayesian coordination game where agents receive private information on the game's payoff structure. In addition, agents receive private signals on each other's private information. We show that once agents possess these different…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

Responsibility has long been a subject of study in law and philosophy. More recently, it became a focus of AI literature. The article investigates the computational complexity of two important properties of responsibility in collective…

We introduce a multi-modal autonomous delivery optimization framework as a coalition game for a fleet of UAVs and ADRs operating in two overlaying networks to address last-mile delivery in urban environments, including high-density areas…

In this work we discuss a random Tug-of-War game in graphs where one of the players has the power to decide at each turn whether to play a round of classical random Tug-of-War, or let the other player choose the new game position in…

Causality is typically treated an all-or-nothing concept; either A is a cause of B or it is not. We extend the definition of causality introduced by Halpern and Pearl [2001] to take into account the degree of responsibility of A for B. For…

Can revealing one's competitive capabilities to an opponent offer strategic benefits? In this paper, we address this question in the context of General Lotto games, a class of two-player competitive resource allocation models. We consider…

We review research papers which use game theory to model the decision making of individuals during an epidemic, attempting to classify the literature and identify the emerging trends in this field. We show that the literature can be…

In competitive resource allocation formulations multiple agents compete over different contests by committing their limited resources in them. For these settings, contest games offer a game-theoretic foundation to analyze how players can…

Social learning is a powerful mechanism through which agents learn about the world from others. However, humans don't always choose to observe others, since social learning can carry time and cognitive resource costs. How do people balance…

This paper proposes a framework and solution concept for repeated coalitional behavior. We model history-dependent schemes that deter coalitions from blocking using continuation promises and punishments. We evaluate the effectiveness of…

In [Van Benthem 2007] the concept of a public announcement is used to study the effect of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We offer a simple generalisation of this approach to cover arbitrary strategic games and…

We extend concurrent game structures (CGSs) with a simple notion of preference over computations and define a minimal notion of rationality for agents based on the concept of dominance. We use this notion to interpret a CL and an ATL…

We introduce the metagame, a conceptual framework for quantifying second-order interaction effects of model explanations. For any first-order attribution $\phi(f)$ explaining a model $f$, we measure the directional influence of feature $j$…