相关论文: An Off-Chip Attack on Hardware Enclaves via the Me…

Adversaries with physical access to a target platform can perform cold boot or DMA attacks to extract sensitive data from the RAM. In response, several main-memory encryption schemes have been proposed to prevent such attacks. Also hardware…

In modern computer systems, user processes are isolated from each other by the operating system and the hardware. Additionally, in a cloud scenario it is crucial that the hypervisor isolates tenants from other tenants that are co-located on…

The widening spectrum of applications and services provided by portable and embedded devices bring a new dimension of concerns in security. Most of those embedded systems (pay-TV, PDAs, mobile phones, etc...) make use of external memory. As…

Cryptographic algorithm implementations are vulnerable to Cold Boot attacks, which consist in exploiting the persistence of RAM cells across reboots or power down cycles to read the memory contents and recover precious sensitive data. The…

Mitigating memory-access attacks on the Intel SGX architecture is an important and open research problem. A natural notion of the mitigation is cache-miss obliviousness which requires the cache-misses emitted during an enclave execution are…

Side-channel information leakage is a known limitation of SGX. Researchers have demonstrated that secret-dependent information can be extracted from enclave execution through page-fault access patterns. Consequently, various recent research…

In cloud computing environments, multiple tenants are often co-located on the same multi-processor system. Thus, preventing information leakage between tenants is crucial. While the hypervisor enforces software isolation, shared hardware,…

GPUs are increasingly being used in security applications, especially for accelerating encryption/decryption. While GPUs are an attractive platform in terms of performance, the security of these devices raises a number of concerns. One…

To provide data and code confidentiality and reduce the risk of information leak from memory or memory bus, computing systems are enhanced with encryption and decryption engine. Despite massive efforts in designing hardware enhancements for…

Side-channel attacks on memory (SCAM) exploit unintended data leaks from memory subsystems to infer sensitive information, posing significant threats to system security. These attacks exploit vulnerabilities in memory access patterns, cache…

Existing tools to detect side-channel attacks on Intel SGX are grounded on the observation that attacks affect the performance of the victim application. As such, all detection tools monitor the potential victim and raise an alarm if the…

Internet of Things devices are widely adopted by the general population. People today are more connected than ever before. The widespread use and low-cost driven construction of these devices in a competitive marketplace render…

The deep learning revolution has been enabled in large part by GPUs, and more recently accelerators, which make it possible to carry out computationally demanding training and inference in acceptable times. As the size of machine learning…

Hardware-based Trusted execution environments (TEEs) offer an isolation granularity of virtual machine abstraction. They provide confidential VMs (CVMs) that host security-sensitive code and data. AMD SEV-SNP and Intel TDX enable CVMs and…

AMD SEV is a hardware extension for main memory encryption on multi-tenant systems. SEV uses an on-chip coprocessor, the AMD Secure Processor, to transparently encrypt virtual machine memory with individual, ephemeral keys never leaving the…

Intel SGX is known to be vulnerable to a class of practical attacks exploiting memory access pattern side-channels, notably page-fault attacks and cache timing attacks. A promising hardening scheme is to wrap applications in hardware…

Caches are used to reduce the speed differential between the CPU and memory to improve the performance of modern processors. However, attackers can use contention-based cache timing attacks to steal sensitive information from victim…

NVIDIA GPUs with GDDR memories have been shown susceptible to Rowhammer-based bit-flips, similar to CPUs. However, Rowhammer exploits on GPUs have been limited to injecting untargeted bit-flips in victim data like weights of machine…

Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGX) introduced new instructions to switch the processor to enclave mode which protects it from introspection. While the enclave mode strongly protects the memory and the state of the processor, it cannot…

Hardware enclaves rely on a disjoint memory model, which maps each physical address to an enclave to achieve strong memory isolation. However, this severely limits the performance and programmability of enclave programs. While some prior…