相关论文: A Physics-Based Attack Detection Technique in Cybe…
This paper deals with analysis, simultaneous detection of faults and attacks, fault-tolerant control and attack-resilient of cyber-physical control systems. In our recent work, it has been observed that an attack detector driven by an input…
In this paper, the problem of simultaneous cyber attack and fault detection and isolation (CAFDI) in cyber-physical systems (CPS) is studied. The proposed solution methodology consists of two filters on the plant and the command and control…
This paper proposes a worst-case data-driven control architecture capable of ensuring the safety of constrained Cyber-Physical Systems under cyber-attacks while minimizing, whenever possible, potential degradation in tracking performance.…
Intelligently designed false data injection (FDI) attacks have been shown to be able to bypass the $\chi^2$-test based bad data detector (BDD), resulting in physical consequences (such as line overloads) in the power system. In this paper,…
Cyberattacks on pipeline operational technology systems pose growing risks to energy infrastructure. This study develops a physics-informed simulation and optimization framework for analyzing cyber-physical threats in petroleum pipeline…
Connectivity in connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) introduces vulnerability to cyber threats such as false data injection (FDI) attacks, which can compromise system reliability and safety. To ensure resilience, this paper proposes a…
By sharing local sensor information via Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) wireless communication networks, Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) is a technology that enables Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAVs) to drive autonomously on the…
State estimation estimates the system condition in real-time and provides a base case for other energy management system (EMS) applications including real-time contingency analysis and security-constrained economic dispatch. Recent work in…
Cybersecurity of Industrial Cyber-Physical Systems is drawing significant concerns as data communication increasingly leverages wireless networks. A lot of data-driven methods were develope for detecting cyberattacks, but few are focused on…
This paper proposes a distributed cyber-attack detection method in communication channels for a class of discrete, nonlinear, heterogeneous, multi-agent systems that are controlled by our proposed formation-based controller. A…
This paper is concerned with the problem of secure multi-sensors fusion estimation for cyber-physical systems, where sensor measurements may be tampered with by false data injection (FDI) attacks. In this work, it is considered that the…
This work discusses a novel framework for simultaneous synthesis of optimal watermarking signal and robust controllers in cyber-physical systems to minimize the loss in performance due to added watermarking signal and to maximize the…
Modern advances in sensor, computing, and communication technologies enable various smart grid applications. The heavy dependence on communication technology has highlighted the vulnerability of the electricity grid to false data injection…
We propose a new defense mechanism against undetected infiltration into controllers in cyber-physical systems. To this end, we cautiously design the outputs of the sensors that monitor the state of the system. Different from the defense…
Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed…
Security issues have gathered growing interest within the control systems community, as physical components and communication networks are increasingly vulnerable to cyber attacks. In this context, recent literature has studied increasingly…
Motivated by the safety and security issues related to cyber-physical systems with potentially multi-rate, delayed, and nonuniformly sampled measurements, we investigate the attack detection and identification using the lifted system model…
Cyber-physical control systems are critical infrastructures designed around highly responsive feedback loops that are measured and manipulated by hundreds of sensors and controllers. Anomalous data, such as from cyber-attacks, greatly risk…
Stealthy false data injection attacks on cyber-physical systems introduce erroneous measurements onto sensors with the intent to degrade system performance. An intelligent attacker can design stealthy attacks with knowledge of the system…
This paper studies physical consequences of unobservable false data injection (FDI) attacks designed only with information inside a sub-network of the power system. The goal of this attack is to overload a chosen target line without being…