相关论文: Verifying that a compiler preserves concurrent val…

Proving only over source code that programs do not leak sensitive data leaves a gap between reasoning and reality that can only be filled by accounting for the behaviour of the compiler. Furthermore, software does not always have the luxury…

Ensuring compliance with Information Flow Security (IFS) is known to be challenging, especially for concurrent systems with large codebases such as multicore operating system (OS) kernels. Refinement, which verifies that an implementation…

Lighthouse projects such as CompCert, seL4, IronFleet, and DeepSpec have demonstrated that full verification of entire systems is feasible by establishing a refinement relation between an abstract system specification and an executable…

Compiler optimizations are designed to improve run-time performance while preserving input-output behavior. Correctness in this sense does not necessarily preserve security: it is known that standard optimizations may break or weaken…

Information flow security ensures that the secret data manipulated by a program does not influence its observable output. Proving information flow security is especially challenging for concurrent programs, where operations on secret data…

Compiler correctness proofs for higher-order concurrent languages are difficult: they involve establishing a termination-preserving refinement between a concurrent high-level source language and an implementation that uses low-level shared…

A desired but challenging property of compiler verification is compositionality, in the sense that the compilation correctness of a program can be deduced incrementally from that of its substructures ranging from statements, functions, and…

This paper presents a theory for the refinement of shared-memory concurrent algorithms from specifications. We augment pre and post condition specifications with Jones' rely and guarantee conditions, all of which are encoded as commands…

Methods for proving that concurrent software does not leak its secrets has remained an active topic of research for at least the past four decades. Despite an impressive array of work, the present situation remains highly unsatisfactory.…

Verified compilation of open modules (i.e., modules whose functionality depends on other modules) provides a foundation for end-to-end verification of modular programs ubiquitous in contemporary software. However, despite intensive…

We propose a new formal criterion for evaluating secure compilation schemes for unsafe languages, expressing end-to-end security guarantees for software components that may become compromised after encountering undefined behavior---for…

Undefined behavior in C often causes devastating security vulnerabilities. One practical mitigation is compartmentalization, which allows developers to structure large programs into mutually distrustful compartments with clearly specified…

Developing secure distributed systems is difficult, and even harder when advanced cryptography must be used to achieve security goals. Following prior work, we advocate using secure program partitioning to synthesize cryptographic…

We present a self-certifying compiler for the COGENT systems language. COGENT is a restricted, polymorphic, higher-order, and purely functional language with linear types and without the need for a trusted runtime or garbage collector. It…

We consider the problem of specifying and proving the security of non-trivial, concurrent programs that intentionally leak information. We present a method that decomposes the problem into (a) proving that the program only leaks information…

Noninterference is a popular semantic security condition because it offers strong end-to-end guarantees, it is inherently compositional, and it can be enforced using a simple security type system. Unfortunately, it is too restrictive for…

Encrypted computing is an emerging technology based on a processor that `works encrypted', taking encrypted inputs to encrypted outputs while data remains in encrypted form throughout. It aims to secure user data against possible insider…

SAFE is a clean-slate design for a highly secure computer system, with pervasive mechanisms for tracking and limiting information flows. At the lowest level, the SAFE hardware supports fine-grained programmable tags, with efficient and…

The majority of modern systems exhibit sophisticated concurrent behaviour, where several system components modify and observe the system state with fine-grained atomicity. Many systems (e.g., multi-core processors, real-time controllers)…

To ensure that secure applications do not leak their secrets, they are required to uphold several security properties such as spatial and temporal memory safety as well as cryptographic constant time. Existing work shows how to enforce…