相关论文: Verifying that a compiler preserves concurrent val…

In cryptography, secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) protocols allow participants to compute a function jointly while keeping their inputs private. Recent breakthroughs are bringing MPC into practice, solving fundamental challenges for…

Scalable and automatic formal verification for concurrent systems is always demanding. In this paper, we propose a verification framework to support automated compositional reasoning for concurrent programs with shared variables. Our…

In this paper, we show a security engineering process based on a formal notion of refinement fully formalized in the proof assistant Isabelle. This Refinement-Risk Cycle focuses on attack analysis and security refinement supported by…

Concurrent revisions is a concurrency control model designed to guarantee determinacy, meaning that the outcomes of programs are uniquely determined. This paper describes an Isabelle/HOL formalization of the model's operational semantics…

The pattern-match safety problem is to verify that a given functional program will never crash due to non-exhaustive patterns in its function definitions. We present a refinement type system that can be used to solve this problem. The…

Refinement transforms an abstract system model into a concrete, executable program, such that properties established for the abstract model carry over to the concrete implementation. Refinement has been used successfully in the development…

In this paper, we introduce a process of formal system development supported by interactive theorem proving in a dedicated Isabelle framework. This Isabelle Infrastructure framework implements specification and verification in a cyclic…

We address the problem of automatic decompilation, converting a program in low-level representation back to a higher-level human-readable programming language. The problem of decompilation is extremely important for security researchers.…

This article describes the development and formal verification (proof of semantic preservation) of a compiler back-end from Cminor (a simple imperative intermediate language) to PowerPC assembly code, using the Coq proof assistant both for…

Formal verification of software and compilers has been used to rule out large classes of security-critical issues, but risk of unintentional information leakage has received much less consideration. It is a key requirement for formal…

Language models (LMs) can perform complex reasoning either end-to-end, with hidden latent state, or compositionally, with transparent intermediate state. Composition offers benefits for interpretability and safety, but may need workflow…

Memory-safety issues and information leakage are known to be depressingly common. We consider the compositional static detection of these kinds of vulnerabilities in first-order C-like programs. Indeed the latter are relational hyper-safety…

Obfuscating compilers protect a software by obscuring its meaning and impeding the reconstruction of its original source code. The typical concern when defining such compilers is their robustness against reverse engineering and the…

Occasionally, developers need to ensure that the compiler treats their code in a specific way that is only visible by inspecting intermediate or final compilation artifacts. This is particularly common with carefully crafted compositional…

We introduce a new methodology based on refinement for testing the functional correctness of hardware and low-level software. Our methodology overcomes several major drawbacks of the de facto testing methodologies used in industry: (1) it…

We introduce Refinement Reflection, a new framework for building SMT-based deductive verifiers. The key idea is to reflect the code implementing a user-defined function into the function's (output) refinement type. As a consequence, at uses…

In this paper, we add a second part to the process of Security Engineering to the Isabelle Insider and Infrastructure framework (IIIf) [31,16] by addressing an old difficult task of refining Information Flow Security (IFC). We address the…

Constant-time programming is a countermeasure to prevent cache based attacks where programs should not perform memory accesses that depend on secrets. In some cases this policy can be safely relaxed if one can prove that the program does…

We use Hidden Markov Models to motivate a quantitative compositional semantics for noninterference-based security with iteration, including a refinement- or "implements" relation that compares two programs with respect to their information…

Universal Composability (UC) is the gold standard for cryptographic security, but mechanizing proofs of UC is notoriously difficult. A recently-discovered connection between UC and Robust Compilation (RC)$\unicode{x2014}$a novel theory of…