相关论文: Leaking Information Through Cache LRU States

Caches have been used to construct various types of covert and side channels to leak information. Most existing cache channels exploit the timing difference between cache hits and cache misses. However, we introduce a new and broader…

Timing channels are information flows, encoded in the relative timing of events, that bypass the system's protection mechanisms. Any microarchitectural state that depends on execution history and affects the rate of progress of later…

Research on cache attacks has shown that CPU caches leak significant information. Proposed detection mechanisms assume that all cache attacks cause more cache hits and cache misses than benign applications and use hardware performance…

The wide deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has given rise to strong demands for optimizing their inference performance. Today's techniques serving this purpose primarily focus on reducing latency and improving throughput through…

Meltdown and Spectre exploit microarchitectural changes the CPU makes during transient out-of-order execution. Using side-channel techniques, these attacks enable leaking arbitrary data from memory. As state-of-the-art software mitigations…

Modern computer architectures rely on caches to reduce the latency gap between the CPU and main memory. While indispensable for performance, caches pose a serious threat to security because they leak information about memory access patterns…

Modern x86 processors have many prefetch instructions that can be used by programmers to boost performance. However, these instructions may also cause security problems. In particular, we found that on Intel processors, there are two…

Covert channel attacks represent a significant threat to system security, leveraging shared resources to clandestinely transmit information from highly secure systems, thereby violating the system's security policies. These attacks exploit…

Modern processors use cache memory: a memory access that "hits" the cache returns early, while a "miss" takes more time. Given a memory access in a program, cache analysis consists in deciding whether this access is always a hit, always a…

Large language models (LLMs) possess extensive knowledge and question-answering capabilities, having been widely deployed in privacy-sensitive domains like finance and medical consultation. During LLM inferences, cache-sharing methods are…

This paper presents a comprehensive comparison of distributed caching algorithms employed in modern distributed systems. We evaluate various caching strategies including Least Recently Used (LRU), Least Frequently Used (LFU), Adaptive…

The transient execution attack is a type of attack leveraging the vulnerability of modern CPU optimization technologies. New attacks surface rapidly. The side-channel is a key part of transient execution attacks to leak data. In this work,…

The timing characteristics of cache, a high-speed storage between the fast CPU and the slowmemory, may reveal sensitive information of a program, thus allowing an adversary to conduct side-channel attacks. Existing methods for detecting…

Caches are used to reduce the speed differential between the CPU and memory to improve the performance of modern processors. However, attackers can use contention-based cache timing attacks to steal sensitive information from victim…

Caching plays a crucial role in networking systems to reduce the load on the network and is commonly employed by content delivery networks (CDNs) in order to improve performance. One of the commonly used mechanisms, Least Recently Used…

Side-channel attacks on shared hardware resources increasingly threaten confidentiality, especially with the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs). In this work, we introduce Spill The Beans, a novel application of cache side-channels to…

This article introduces a novel family of decentralised caching policies, applicable to wireless networks with finite storage at the edge-nodes (stations). These policies, that are based on the Least-Recently-Used replacement principle, are…

Timing and cache side channels provide powerful attacks against many sensitive operations including cryptographic implementations. Existing defenses cannot protect against all classes of such attacks without incurring prohibitive…

This article introduces a novel family of decentralised caching policies, applicable to wireless networks with finite storage at the edge-nodes (stations). These policies are based on the Least-Recently-Used replacement principle, and are,…

Modern computer architectures share physical resources between different programs in order to increase area-, energy-, and cost-efficiency. Unfortunately, sharing often gives rise to side channels that can be exploited for extracting or…