相关论文: Attaining Fairness in Communication for Omniscienc…

The Shapley value provides a principled framework for fairly distributing rewards among participants according to their individual contributions. While prior work has applied this concept to data valuation in machine learning, existing…

Explainability and fairness have mainly been considered separately, with recent exceptions trying the explain the sources of unfairness. This paper shows that the Shapley value can be used to both define and explain unfairness, under…

Blockchain has been used in several domains. However, this technology still has major limitations that are largely related to one of its core components, namely the consensus protocol/algorithm. Several solutions have been proposed in…

Decent social fairness is highly desired both for socio-economic activities and individuals, as it is one of the cornerstones of our social welfare and sustainability. How to effectively promote the level of fairness thus becomes a…

We study common randomness where two parties have access to i.i.d. samples from a known random source, and wish to generate a shared random key using limited (or no) communication with the largest possible probability of agreement. This…

We introduce a class of cooperative games induced by weighted directed graphs. Specifically, the coalitional value combines an internal interaction term given by the induced subgraph game with an external component based on minimal incoming…

The rapid growth of wireless and mobile Internet has led to wide applications of exchanging resources over network, in which how to fairly allocate resources has become a critical challenge. To motivate sharing, a BD Mechanism is proposed…

One of the long-debated issues in coalitional game theory is how to extend the Shapley value to games with externalities (partition-function games). When externalities are present, not only can a player's marginal contribution - a central…

Consider a setting where selfish agents are to be assigned to coalitions or projects from a fixed set P. Each project k is characterized by a valuation function; v_k(S) is the value generated by a set S of agents working on project k. We…

The computation of a solution concept of a cooperative game usually employs values of all coalitions. However, in some applications, the values of some of the coalitions might be unknown due to high costs associated with their determination…

Richman games are zero-sum games, where in each turn players bid in order to determine who will play next [Lazarus et al.'99]. We extend the theory to impartial general-sum two player games called \emph{bidding games}, showing the existence…

Recent spectrum-sharing research has produced a strategy to address spectrum scarcity problems. This novel idea, named cognitive radio, considers that secondary users can opportunistically exploit spectrum holes left temporarily unused by…

Cooperative games with nonempty core are called balanced, and the set of balanced games is a polyhedron. Given a game with empty core, we look for the closest balanced game, in the sense of the (weighted) Euclidean distance, i.e., the…

In this paper, we introduce a game theoretic framework for studying the problem of minimizing the completion time of instantly decodable network coding (IDNC) for cooperative data exchange (CDE) in decentralized wireless network. In this…

Shapley values, which were originally designed to assign attributions to individual players in coalition games, have become a commonly used approach in explainable machine learning to provide attributions to input features for black-box…

An increasing number of businesses and organisations rely on existing users for finding new users or spreading a message. One of the widely used "refer-a-friend" mechanisms offers an equal reward to both the referrer and the invitee. This…

We study a distributed sampling problem where a set of processors want to output (approximately) independent and identically distributed samples from a joint distribution with the help of a common message from a coordinator. Each processor…

Game-theoretic techniques and equilibria analysis facilitate the design and verification of competitive systems. While algorithmic complexity of equilibria computation has been extensively studied, practical implementation and application…

We present a general framework for solving a large class of learning problems with non-linear functions of classification rates. This includes problems where one wishes to optimize a non-decomposable performance metric such as the F-measure…

When deploying a single predictor across multiple subpopulations, we propose a fundamentally different approach: interpreting group fairness as a bargaining problem among subpopulations. This game-theoretic perspective reveals that existing…