相关论文: SIMCom: Statistical Sniffing of Inter-Module Commu…

Stealthy hardware Trojans (HTs) inserted during the fabrication of integrated circuits can bypass the security of critical infrastructures. Although researchers have proposed many techniques to detect HTs, several limitations exist,…

Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) hardware, such as microprocessors, are widely adopted in system design due to their ability to reduce development time and cost compared to custom solutions. However, supply chain entities involved in the…

Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) components are often preferred over custom Integrated Circuits (ICs) to achieve reduced system development time and cost, easy adoption of new technologies, and replaceability. Unfortunately, the integration…

Thermal Trojan attacks present a pressing concern for the security and reliability of System-on-Chips (SoCs), especially in mobile applications. The situation becomes more complicated when such attacks are more evasive and operate…

Scalable service-Oriented Middleware over IP (SOME/IP) is an Ethernet communication standard protocol in the Automotive Open System Architecture (AUTOSAR), promoting ECU-to-ECU communication over the IP stack. However, SOME/IP lacks a…

In this paper, we introduce a Learning Assisted Side Channel delay Analysis (LASCA) methodology for Hardware Trojan detection. Our proposed solution, unlike the prior art, does not require a Golden IC. Instead, it trains a Neural Network to…

Hardware Trojans have drawn the attention of academia, industry and government agencies. Effective detection mechanisms and countermeasures against such malicious designs can only be developed when there is a deep understanding of how…

Side-channel analysis has been proven effective at detecting hardware Trojans in integrated circuits (ICs). However, most detection techniques rely on large external probes and antennas for data collection and require a long measurement…

The globalized semiconductor supply chain has made Hardware Trojans (HT) a significant security threat to embedded systems, necessitating the design of efficient and adaptable detection mechanisms. Despite promising machine learning-based…

This paper reports a novel approach that uses transistor aging in an integrated circuit (IC) to detect hardware Trojans. When a transistor is aged, it results in delays along several paths of the IC. This increase in delay results in timing…

Cyber-physical systems rely on sensors, communication, and computing, all powered by integrated circuits (ICs). ICs are largely susceptible to various hardware attacks with malicious intents. One of the stealthiest threats is the insertion…

Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs) from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual…

The use of third-party IP cores in implementing applications in FPGAs has given rise to the threat of malicious alterations through the insertion of hardware Trojans. To address this threat, it is important to predict the way hardware…

Hardware trojans are malicious circuits which compromise the functionality and security of an integrated circuit (IC). These circuits are manufactured directly into the silicon and cannot be fixed by security patches like software. The…

HTTP-based Trojan is extremely threatening, and it is difficult to be effectively detected because of its concealment and confusion. Previous detection methods usually are with poor generalization ability due to outdated datasets and…

The commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) component based ecosystem provides an attractive system design paradigm due to the drastic reduction in development time and cost compared to custom solutions. However, it brings in a growing concern of…

Always-on hardware Trojans (HTs) pose a critical risk to trusted microelectronics, yet most side-channel detection methods rely on unavailable golden references. We present a reference-free approach that combines time-frequency EM analysis…

Hardware Trojans (HT s) are a persistent threat to integrated circuits, especially when inserted at the register-transfer level (RTL). Existing methods typically first convert the design into a graph, such as a gate-level netlist or an…

Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) is the most essential component for polynomial multiplications used in lattice-based Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms such as Kyber, Dilithium, NTRU etc. However, side-channel attacks (SCA) and…

With the globalization of the semiconductor manufacturing process, electronic devices are powerless against malicious modification of hardware in the supply chain. The ever-increasing threat of hardware Trojan attacks against integrated…