相关论文: Spatial interactions and oscillatory tragedies of …

We demonstrate the emergence of self-organized structures in the course of the relaxation of an initially excited, dissipative and finite chain of interacting particles in a periodic potential towards its many particle equilibrium…

Cooperative game theory studies how to allocate the joint value generated by a set of players. These games are typically analyzed using the characteristic function form with transferable utility, which represents the value attainable by…

We derive a class of macroscopic differential equations that describe collective adaptation, starting from a discrete-time stochastic microscopic model. The behavior of each agent is a dynamic balance between adaptation that locally…

Ecologists and economists try to explain collective behavior in terms of competitive systems of selfish individuals with the ability to learn from the past. Statistical physicists have been investigating models which might contribute to the…

In this letter we present a stochastic dynamic model which can explain economic cycles. We show that the macroscopic description yields a complex dynamical landscape consisting of multiple stable fixed points, each corresponding to a split…

In a regular mean field game (MFG), the agents are assumed to be insignificant, they do not realize their effect on the population level and this may result in a phenomenon coined as the Tragedy of the Commons by the economists. However, in…

We study a class of non-cooperative aggregative games -- denoted as \emph{social purpose games} -- in which the payoffs depend separately on a player's own strategy (individual benefits) and on a function of the strategy profile which is…

Efficient allocation and use of limited resources are fundamental to advancing collective welfare and achieving long-term societal sustainability. This challenge involves not only how policymakers distribute scarce resources among…

Using methods from evolutionary game theory, this paper investigates the difference between social cohesion and task cohesion in promoting the evolution of cooperation in group interactions. Players engage in public goods games and are…

The public goods game is a famous example illustrating the tragedy of the commons. In this game cooperating individuals contribute to a pool, which in turn is distributed to all members of the group, including defectors who reap the same…

In this communication, a simple mechanism in the optional public goods game is experimentally investigated using two experimental settings; and first time, the cyclic strategy pattern in full state space is demonstrated by means of…

Studying social dilemmas prompts the question of how cooperation can emerge in situations where individuals are expected to act selfishly. Here, in the framework of the one-shot Public Goods Game (PGG), we introduce the concept that…

The emergence of collective cooperation in competitive environments is a well-known phenomenon in biology, economics, and social systems. While most evolutionary game models focus on the evolution of strategies for a fixed game, how…

Cooperation in repeated public goods game is hardly achieved, unless contingent behavior is present. Surely, if mechanisms promoting positive assortment between cooperators are present, then cooperators may beat defectors, because…

Traditional approaches to ecosystem modelling have relied on spatially homogeneous approximations to interaction, growth and death. More recently, spatial interaction and dispersal have also been considered. While these leads to certain…

We show that the simplest stochastic epidemiological models with spatial correlations exhibit two types of oscillatory behaviour in the endemic phase. In a large parameter range, the oscillations are due to resonant amplification of…

People tend to have their social interactions with members of their own community. Such group-structured interactions can have a profound impact on the behaviors that evolve. Group structure affects the way people cooperate, and how they…

The fact that individuals will most likely behave differently in different situations begets the introduction of conditional strategies. Inspired by this, we study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, where besides…

This paper considers a dynamic game with transferable utilities (TU), where the characteristic function is a continuous-time bounded mean ergodic process. A central planner interacts continuously over time with the players by choosing the…

The replicator equation in evolutionary game theory describes the change in a population's behaviors over time given suitable incentives. It arises when individuals make decisions using a simple learning process - imitation. A recent…