相关论文: Incentives and Coordination in Bottleneck Models

To achieve an optimal outcome in many situations, agents need to choose distinct actions from one another. This is the case notably in many resource allocation problems, where a single resource can only be used by one agent at a time. How…

We study the efficiency of mechanisms for allocating a divisible resource. Given scalar signals submitted by all users, such a mechanism decides the fraction of the resource that each user will receive and a payment that will be collected…

Organizations devote substantial resources to coordination, yet which tasks actually require it for correctness remains unclear. The problem is acute in multi-agent AI systems, where coordination cost is directly measurable and can exceed…

We consider multi-agent decision making where each agent's cost function depends on all agents' strategies. We propose a distributed algorithm to learn a Nash equilibrium, whereby each agent uses only obtained values of her cost function at…

We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games. In these games, a graph with designated source $s$ and sink $t$ is given, and each edge is associated with some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an $s$-$t$ path,…

We investigate a coordination model for a two-stage collective decision-making problem within the framework of global games. The agents observe noisy signals of a shared random variable, referred to as the fundamental, which determines the…

We model an informed agent with information about the future value of an asset trying to maximize profits when subjected to a transaction cost as well as a market maker tasked with setting fair transaction prices. In a single auction model,…

In recent years, federated learning has been embraced as an approach for bringing about collaboration across large populations of learning agents. However, little is known about how collaboration protocols should take agents' incentives…

This paper studies queueing problems with an endogenous number of machines with and without an initial queue, the novelty being that coalitions not only choose how to queue, but also on how many machines. For a given problem, agents can…

We study a complementarity game as a systematic tool for the investigation of the interplay between individual optimization and population effects and for the comparison of different strategy and learning schemes. The game randomly pairs…

Congestion games are popular models often used to study the system-level inefficiencies caused by selfish agents, typically measured by the price of anarchy. One may expect that aligning the agents' preferences with the system-level…

This paper examines the impact of agents' myopic optimization on the efficiency of systems comprised by many selfish agents. In contrast to standard congestion games where agents interact in a one-shot fashion, in our model each agent…

Cost of time passing plays an important role when investigate the collective behaviour in real world. Each rational individual can get a more reasonable strategy by comprehensively considering the time cost. Motivated by the fact, we here…

We study the impact of strategic behavior in labor markets characterized by algorithmic monoculture, where firms compete for a shared pool of applicants using a common algorithmic evaluation. In this setting, "naive" hiring strategies lead…

This paper focuses on the coordination of a large population of dynamic agents with private information over multiple periods. Each agent maximizes the individual utility, while the coordinator determines the market rule to achieve group…

How do incentive levels affect strategic behaviour? We address this with an experiment that separately identifies own- and opponent-incentive effects in two dominance-solvable games that differ in strategic complexity. Higher own incentives…

Consider an unobservable $M|G|1$ queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and…

Cooperators benefit others with paying costs. Evolution of cooperation crucially depends on the cost-benefit ratio of cooperation, denoted as $c$. In this work, we investigate the infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma for various values of…

We study Bayesian coordination games where agents receive noisy private information over the game's payoff structure, and over each others' actions. If private information over actions is precise, we find that agents can coordinate on…

The orderly behaviors observed in large-scale groups, such as fish schooling and the organized movement of crowds, are both ubiquitous and essential for the survival and stability of these systems. Understanding how such complex collective…