相关论文: Towards Robust Monitoring of Stealthy Diffusion

Network systems often contain vulnerabilities that remain unfixed in a network for various reasons, such as the lack of a patch or knowledge to fix them. With the presence of such residual vulnerabilities, the network administrator should…

Security games model the confrontation between a defender protecting a set of targets and an attacker who tries to capture them. A variant of these games assumes security interdependence between targets, facilitating contagion of an attack.…

The spread of new ideas, behaviors or technologies has been extensively studied using epidemic models. Here we consider a model of diffusion where the individuals' behavior is the result of a strategic choice. We study a simple coordination…

This paper considers the problem of security allocation in a networked control system under stealthy attacks. The system is comprised of interconnected subsystems represented by vertices. A malicious adversary selects a single vertex on…

The network virus propagation is influenced by various factors, and some of them are neglected in most of the existed models in the literature. In this paper, we study the network virus propagation based on the the epidemiological…

This paper studies a stochastic game theoretic approach to security and intrusion detection in communication and computer networks. Specifically, an Attacker and a Defender take part in a two-player game over a network of nodes whose…

This work uses Game Theory to study the effectiveness of punishments as an incentive for rational nodes to follow an epidemic dissemination protocol. The dissemination process is modeled as an infinite repetition of a stage game. At the end…

Stealthy attacks are a major cyber-security threat. In practice, both attackers and defenders have resource constraints that could limit their capabilities. Hence, to develop robust defense strategies, a promising approach is to utilize…

We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…

This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…

The rapid expansion of Internet use has increased system exposure to cyber threats, with advanced persistent threats (APTs) being especially challenging due to their stealth, prolonged duration, and multi-stage attacks targeting high-value…

We consider a two-player network inspection game, in which a defender allocates sensors with potentially heterogeneous detection capabilities in order to detect multiple attacks caused by a strategic attacker. The objective of the defender…

We consider the distributed $H_\infty$ estimation problem with an additional requirement of resilience to biasing attacks. An attack scenario is considered where an adversary misappropriates some of the observer nodes and injects biasing…

This paper studies a strategic security problem in networked control systems under stealthy false data injection attacks. The security problem is modeled as a bilateral cognitive security game between a defender and an adversary, each…

The goal of an infection source node (e.g., a rumor or computer virus source) in a network is to spread its infection to as many nodes as possible, while remaining hidden from the network administrator. On the other hand, the network…

In two-player finite-state stochastic games of partial observation on graphs, in every state of the graph, the players simultaneously choose an action, and their joint actions determine a probability distribution over the successor states.…

In green security, defenders must forecast adversarial behavior, such as poaching, illegal logging, and illegal fishing, to plan effective patrols. These behavior are often highly uncertain and complex. Prior work has leveraged game theory…

We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a complete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In each stage, a source disseminates $\nu$ events. Each event is sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first…

Recent innovations in the design of computer viruses have led to new trade-offs for the attacker. Multiple variants of a malware may spread at different rates and have different levels of visibility to the network. In this work we examine…

While social networks are widely used as a media for information diffusion, attackers can also strategically employ analytical tools, such as influence maximization, to maximize the spread of adversarial content through the networks. We…