相关论文: Social Choice with Non Quasi-linear Utilities

We consider the house allocation problems with strict preferences, where monetary transfers are not allowed. We propose two properties in the spirit of justified fairness. Interestingly, together with other well-studied properties…

An important goal of empirical demand analysis is choice and welfare prediction on counterfactual budget sets arising from potential policy-interventions. Such predictions are more credible when made without arbitrary…

We consider the egalitarian welfare aspects of random assignment mechanisms when agents have unrestricted cardinal utilities over the objects. We give bounds on how well different random assignment mechanisms approximate the optimal…

We develop a purely theoretical mechanism in which provincial bailouts are disciplined by two levers derived from Weighted Representative Democracy (WRD): a political shadow cost of public funds and a weighted-consent cap on any transfer.…

We study a robust stochastic optimization problem in the quasi-sure setting in discrete-time. We show that under a lineality-type condition the problem admits a maximizer. This condition is implied by the no-arbitrage condition in models of…

Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non-probabilistic social choice, these…

How to design fair and (computationally) efficient voting rules is a central challenge in Computational Social Choice. In this paper, we aim at designing efficient algorithms for computing most equitable rules for large classes of…

We study a market mechanism that sets edge prices to incentivize strategic agents to efficiently share limited network capacity. In this market, agents form coalitions, with each coalition sharing a unit capacity of a selected route and…

We study the social efficiency of bilateral trade between a seller and a buyer. In the classical Bayesian setting, the celebrated Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem states that no Bayesian incentive-compatible, individually…

Submodular functions -- functions exhibiting diminishing returns -- are central to machine learning. When the objective is monotone and non-negative, the greedy algorithm achieves a tight $63\%$ approximation. But many practical objectives…

The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit…

We study the problem of maximising terminal utility for an agent facing model uncertainty, in a frictionless discrete-time market with one safe asset and finitely many risky assets. We show that an optimal investment strategy exists if the…

When making a decision as a group, there are two primary paradigms: aggregating preferences (e.g. voting, mechanism design) and aggregating information (e.g. discussion, consulting, forecasting). Almost all formally-studied group…

Option pricing in real markets faces fundamental challenges. The Black--Scholes--Merton (BSM) model assumes constant volatility and uses a linear generator $g(t,x,y,z)=-ry$, while lacking explicit behavioral factors, resulting in systematic…

In social choice settings with linear preferences, random dictatorship is known to be the only social decision scheme satisfying strategyproofness and ex post efficiency. When also allowing indifferences, random serial dictatorship (RSD) is…

We consider an economic environment with one buyer and one seller. For a bundle $(t,q)\in [0,\infty[\times [0,1]=\mathbb{Z}$, $q$ refers to the winning probability of an object, and $t$ denotes the payment that the buyer makes. We consider…

Submodular continuous functions are a category of (generally) non-convex/non-concave functions with a wide spectrum of applications. We characterize these functions and demonstrate that they can be maximized efficiently with approximation…

We investigate a model of sequential decision-making where a single alternative is chosen at each round. We focus on two objectives -- utilitarian welfare (Util) and egalitarian welfare (Egal) -- and consider the computational complexity of…

We study mechanism design for combinatorial cost sharing. Imagine that multiple items or services are available to be shared among a set of interested agents. The outcome of a mechanism in this setting consists of an assignment, determining…

We study the existence of the numeraire portfolio under predictable convex constraints in a general semimartingale model of a financial market. The numeraire portfolio generates a wealth process, with respect to which the relative wealth…