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A common assumption employed in most previous works on evolutionary game dynamics is that every individual player has full knowledge about and full access to the complete set of available strategies. In realistic social, economical, and…

In this paper, we study analytically the statistics of the number of equilibria in pairwise social dilemma evolutionary games with mutation where a game's payoff entries are random variables. Using the replicator-mutator equations, we…

Evolutionary game theory is a powerful framework for studying evolution in populations of interacting individuals. A common assumption in evolutionary game theory is that interactions are symmetric, which means that the players are…

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of reinforcement learning under multi-agent settings has long remained an open problem. While previous works primarily focus on 2-player games, we consider population games, which model the strategic…

The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…

We introduce and study an evolutionary complementarity game where in each round a player of population 1 is paired with a member of population 2. The game is symmetric, and each player tries to obtain an advantageous deal, but when one of…

The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…

Game theory has been one of the most successful quantitative concepts to describe social interactions, their strategical aspects, and outcomes. Among the payoff matrix quantifying the result of a social interaction, the interaction…

We study evolutionary game dynamics in a well-mixed populations of finite size, N. A well-mixed population means that any two individuals are equally likely to interact. In particular we consider the average abundances of two strategies, A…

Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations are strongly affected by updating rules. Previous studies usually focus on imitation-based rules, which rely on payoff information of social peers. Recent behavioral experiments suggest…

In repeated interactions between individuals, we do not expect that exactly the same situation will occur from one time to another. Contrary to what is common in models of repeated games in the literature, most real situations may differ a…

In this work we study a weak Prisoner\^as Dilemma game in which both strategies and update rules are subjected to evolutionary pressure. Interactions among agents are specified by complex topologies, and we consider both homogeneous and…

In this letter, we deal with evolutionary game theoretic learning processes for population games on networks with dynamically evolving communities. Specifically, we propose a novel mathematical framework in which a deterministic,…

We study the effects of individual perceptions of payoffs in two-player games. In particular we consider the setting in which individuals' perceptions of the game are influenced by their previous experiences and outcomes. Accordingly, we…

The best-response dynamics is an example of an evolutionary game where players update their strategy in order to maximize their payoff. The main objective of this paper is to study a stochastic spatial version of this game based on the…

We study a multi-agent decision problem in population games, where agents select from multiple available strategies and continually revise their selections based on the payoffs associated with these strategies. Unlike conventional…

Population structure induced by both spatial embedding and more general networks of interaction, such as model social networks, have been shown to have a fundamental effect on the dynamics and outcome of evolutionary games. These effects…

In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in…

Intransitivity is supposed to be a main reason for deficits in coevolutionary progress and inheritable superiority. Besides, coevolutionary dynamics is characterized by interactions yielding subjective fitness, but aiming at solutions that…

This paper investigates the long-term behavior of an interacting particle system of interest in the hot topic of evolutionary game theory. Each site of the $d$-dimensional integer lattice is occupied by a player who is characterized by one…