相关论文: Truncation selection and diffusion on lattices

The promotion of cooperation on spatial lattices is an important issue in evolutionary game theory. This effect clearly depends on the update rule: it diminishes with stochastic imitative rules whereas it increases with unconditional…

We study the emergency of mutual cooperation in evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games when the players are located on a square lattice. The players can choose one of the three strategies: cooperation (C), defection (D) or "tit for tat" (T),…

Frequency-dependent selection reflects the interaction between different species as they battle for limited resources in their environment. In a stochastic evolutionary game the species relative fitnesses guides the evolutionary dynamics…

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This…

In human societies the probability of strategy adoption from a given person may be affected by the personal features. Now we investigate how an artificially imposed restricted ability to reproduce, overruling ones fitness, affects an…

This paper investigates discrete-time evolutionary games with a general stochastic imitation rule on the toroidal grid, which is a grid network with periodic boundary conditions. The imitation rule has been considered as a fundamental rule…

The effects of networking on the extent of cooperation emerging in a competitive setting are studied. The evolutionary snowdrift game, which represents a realistic alternative to the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma, is studied in the…

We consider a stochastic model for evolution of group-structured populations in which interactions between group members correspond to the Prisoner's Dilemma or the Hawk-Dove game. Selection operates at two organization levels: individuals…

We study mechanisms of synchronisation, coordination, and equilibrium selection in two-player coordination games on multilayer networks. We apply the approach from evolutionary game theory with three possible update rules: the replicator…

An evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located on a hierarchical structure of layered square lattices. The players can follow two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their income comes from PD…

The commonly used accumulated payoff scheme is not invariant with respect to shifts of payoff values when applied locally in degree-inhomogeneous population structures. We propose a suitably modified payoff scheme and we show both formally…

We study the combined influence of selection and random fluctuations on the evolutionary dynamics of two-strategy ("cooperation" and "defection") games in populations comprising cooperation facilitators. The latter are individuals that…

Recent empirical studies suggest that heavy-tailed distributions of human activities are universal in real social dynamics [Muchnik, \emph{et al.}, Sci. Rep. \textbf{3}, 1783 (2013)]. On the other hand, community structure is ubiquitous in…

The game interactions among individuals in nature are often uncertain and dynamically evolving, significantly influencing the persistence of cooperation. However, it remains a formidable challenge to effectively characterize these dynamic…

Decision-making individuals often imitate their highest-earning fellows rather than optimize their own utilities, due to bounded rationality and incomplete information. Perpetual fluctuations between decisions have been reported as the…

We explore the Hawk-Dove game on networks with topologies ranging from regular lattices to random graphs with small-world networks in between. This is done by means of computer simulations using several update rules for the population…

This study investigates the influence of lattice structure in evolutionary games. The snowdrift games is considered in networks with high clustering coefficients, that use four different strategy-updating. Analytical conjectures using pair…

We study the effects of conformity, the tendency of humans to imitate locally common behaviors, in the evolution of cooperation when individuals occupy the vertices of a graph and engage in the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma or the Snowdrift…

Evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations has been extensively explored in past decades. However, most previous studies assume that payoffs of individuals are fully determined by the strategic behaviors of interacting parties and…

Evolutionary game dynamics on networks typically consider the competition among simple strategies such as cooperation and defection in the Prisoner's Dilemma and summarize the effect of population structure as network reciprocity. However,…