相关论文: Quantitative Models of Imperfect Deception in Netw…

We introduce a set-valued solution concept, M equilibrium, to capture empirical regularities from over half a century of game-theory experiments. We show M equilibrium serves as a meta theory for various models that hitherto were considered…

We describe an algorithm for computing best response strategies in a class of two-player infinite games of incomplete information, defined by payoffs piecewise linear in agents' types and actions, conditional on linear comparisons of…

A Bayesian game is a game of incomplete information in which the rules of the game are not fully known to all players. We consider the Bayesian game of Battle of Sexes that has several Bayesian Nash equilibria and investigate its outcome…

Many real-world systems are composed of interdependent networks that rely on one another. Such networks are typically designed and operated by different entities, who aim at maximizing their own payoffs. There exists a game among these…

We study a model of strategic coordination based on a class of games with incomplete information known as Global Games. Under the assumption of Poisson-distributed signals and a Gamma prior distribution on state of the system, we…

In imperfect information games, the evaluation of a game state not only depends on the observable world but also relies on hidden parts of the environment. As accessing the obstructed information trivialises state evaluations, one approach…

In this paper, we study finite-agent linear-quadratic games on graphs. Specifically, we propose a comprehensive framework that extends the existing literature by incorporating heterogeneous and interpretable player interactions. Compared to…

Security games model strategic interactions in adversarial real-world applications. Such applications often involve extremely large but highly structured strategy sets (e.g., selecting a distribution over all patrol routes in a given…

Systems of competing agents can often be modeled as games. Assuming rationality, the most likely outcomes are given by an equilibrium (e.g. a Nash equilibrium). In many practical settings, games are influenced by context, i.e. additional…

Revealing the interaction topology underlying strategic behavior is fundamental to prediction, intervention, and policy design in networked systems. Yet the interaction matrix is often unobservable, and passive observation of repeated…

Prediction is a well-studied machine learning task, and prediction algorithms are core ingredients in online products and services. Despite their centrality in the competition between online companies who offer prediction-based products,…

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action…

We present an algorithm that identifies the reasoning patterns of agents in a game, by iteratively examining the graph structure of its Multi-Agent Influence Diagram (MAID) representation. If the decision of an agent participates in no…

Among the most fundamental tools for social network analysis are centrality measures, which quantify the importance of every node in the network. This centrality analysis typically disregards the possibility that the network may have been…

A repeated network game where agents have quadratic utilities that depend on information externalities -- an unknown underlying state -- as well as payoff externalities -- the actions of all other agents in the network -- is considered.…

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability,…

This article introduces a class of $Nash$ games among $Stackelberg$ players ($NASPs$), namely, a class of simultaneous non-cooperative games where the players solve sequential Stackelberg games. Specifically, each player solves a…

We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game of influence is an infinite repeated game with incomplete information in…

We study the security of interaction protocols when incentives of participants are taken into account. We begin by formally defining correctness of a protocol, given a notion of rationality and utilities of participating agents. Based on…

The use of game theoretic models has been quite successful in describing various cooperative and non-cooperative optimization problems in networks and other domains of computer systems. In this paper, we study an application of game…