相关论文: Optimal Attack against Cyber-Physical Control Syst…

This paper studies the performance and resilience of a linear cyber-physical control system (CPCS) with attack detection and reactive attack mitigation in the context of power grids. It addresses the problem of deriving an optimal sequence…

This paper studies an attacker against a cyber-physical system (CPS) whose goal is to move the state of a CPS to a target state while ensuring that his or her probability of being detected does not exceed a given bound. The attacker's…

This paper proposes a framework for secure and resilient controller design for positive systems against cyber-attacks. In particular, we consider a network-controlled system where an adversary injects false data into the actuator channels…

Owing to the advanced communication networks and intelligent electronic devices, the cyber-physical distribution systems (CPDSs) possess the capability to perform flexible economic dispatch and achieve rapid self-healing from extreme…

Industrial Control Systems (ICSs) are widely used in critical infrastructures that face various cyberattacks causing physical damage. With the increasing integration of the ICSs and information technology (IT), ensuring the security of ICSs…

Physical consequences to power systems of false data injection cyber-attacks are considered. Prior work has shown that the worst-case consequences of such an attack can be determined using a bi-level optimization problem, wherein an attack…

Cyber-physical systems (CPS) encounter a large volume of data which is added to the system gradually in real time and not altogether in advance. As the volume of data increases, the domain of the control strategies also increases, and thus…

We explore an optimal impulse control problem wherein an electronic device owner strategically calibrates protection levels against cyber attacks. Utilizing epidemiological compartment models, we qualitatively characterize the dynamics of…

This paper addresses the challenge of amplitude-unbounded false data injection (FDI) attacks targeting the sensor-to-controller (S-C) channel in cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We introduce a resilient tube-based model predictive control…

This paper studies attackers with control objectives against cyber-physical systems (CPS). The system is equipped with its own controller and attack detector, and the goal of the attacker is to move the system to a target state while…

Cyber data attacks are the worst-case interacting bad data to power system state estimation and cannot be detected by existing bad data detectors. In this paper, we for the first time analyze the likelihood of cyber data attacks by…

Modern Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) are often designed as networked, software-based controller implementations which have been found to be vulnerable to network-level and physical level attacks. A number of research works have proposed…

In this paper, we present the concept of boosting the resiliency of optimization-based observers for cyber-physical systems (CPS) using auxiliary sources of information. Due to the tight coupling of physics, communication and computation, a…

Cyber-physical systems integrate computation, communication, and physical capabilities to interact with the physical world and humans. Besides failures of components, cyber-physical systems are prone to malicious attacks so that specific…

This article provides a tool for analyzing mechanisms that aim to achieve resilience against stealthy, or undetectable, attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPSs). We consider attackers who are able to corrupt all of the inputs and outputs of…

This paper proposes a game-theoretic method to address the problem of optimal detector placement in a networked control system under cyber-attacks. The networked control system is composed of interconnected agents where each agent is…

Future power networks will be characterized by safe and reliable functionality against physical malfunctions and cyber attacks. This paper proposes a unified framework and advanced monitoring procedures to detect and identify network…

This paper addresses the problem of distributed resilient state estimation and control for linear time-invariant systems in the presence of malicious false data injection sensor attacks and bounded noise. We consider a system operator…

False Data Injection (FDI) attacks are one of the challenges that the modern power system, as a cyber-physical system, is encountering. Designing AC FDI attacks that accurately address the physics of the power systems could jeopardize the…

In this paper, we investigate the feasibility and physical consequences of cyber attacks against energy management systems (EMS). Within this framework, we have designed a complete simulation platform to emulate realistic EMS operations: it…