相关论文: Crowdsourcing with Tullock contests: A new perspec…

As the driving force of crowdsourcing is the interaction among participants, various incentive mechanisms have been proposed to attract sufficient participants. However, the existing works assume that all the providers always meet the…

We consider collaborative systems where users make contributions across multiple available projects and are rewarded for their contributions in individual projects according to a local sharing of the value produced. This serves as a model…

We consider a requester who acquires a set of data (e.g. images) that is not owned by one party. In order to collect as many data as possible, crowdsourcing mechanisms have been widely used to seek help from the crowd. However, existing…

Online bidding serves as a fundamental information system in mobile ecosystems, facilitating real-time ad allocation across billions of devices while optimizing both platform performance and user experience through data-driven decision…

In many social-choice mechanisms the resulting choice is not the most preferred one for some of the participants, thus the need for methods to justify the choice made in a way that improves the acceptance and satisfaction of said…

Scholars have increasingly investigated "crowdsourcing" as an alternative to expert-based judgment or purely data-driven approaches to predicting the future. Under certain conditions, scholars have found that crowdsourcing can outperform…

Crowdsourcing has been successfully employed in the past as an effective and cheap way to execute classification tasks and has therefore attracted the attention of the research community. However, we still lack a theoretical understanding…

Incentive mechanism design has aroused extensive attention for crowdsourcing applications in recent years. Most research assumes that participants are already in the system and aware of the existence of crowdsourcing tasks. Whereas in real…

A principal uses payments conditioned on stochastic outcomes of a team project to elicit costly effort from the team members. We develop a multi-agent generalization of a classic first-order approach to contract optimization by leveraging…

In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical, lower reward irrespective of their actual qualities.…

Crowd sensing is a new paradigm which leverages the pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect sensing data, enabling numerous novel applications. To achieve good service quality for a crowd sensing application, incentive mechanisms are…

Vehicular mobile crowd sensing is a fast-emerging paradigm to collect data about the environment by mounting sensors on vehicles such as taxis. An important problem in vehicular crowd sensing is to design payment mechanisms to incentivize…

We present CrowdHub, a tool for running systematic evaluations of task designs on top of crowdsourcing platforms. The goal is to support the evaluation process, avoiding potential experimental biases that, according to our empirical…

Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…

Crowdsourcing is now widely used to replace judgement by an expert authority with an aggregate evaluation from a number of non-experts, in applications ranging from rating and categorizing online content to evaluation of student assignments…

Crowdsourced on-demand services offer benefits such as reduced costs, faster service fulfillment times, greater adaptability, and contributions to sustainable urban transportation in on-demand delivery contexts. However, the success of an…

Peer prediction incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing are generally limited to eliciting samples from categorical distributions. Prior work on extending peer prediction to arbitrary distributions has largely relied on assumptions on the…

Within the framework of Game Theory, contests study decision-making in those situations or conflicts when rewards depend on the relative rank between contenders rather than their absolute performance. By relying on the formalism of Tullock…

We consider crowdsourcing problems where the users are asked to provide evaluations for items; the user evaluations are then used directly, or aggregated into a consensus value. Lacking an incentive scheme, users have no motive in making…

In this paper we consider a mechanism design problem in the context of large-scale crowdsourcing markets such as Amazon's Mechanical Turk, ClickWorker, CrowdFlower. In these markets, there is a requester who wants to hire workers to…