相关论文: Quantifying the Information Leak in Cache Attacks …

This thesis addresses the foundational aspects of formal methods for applications in security and in particular in anonymity. More concretely, we develop frameworks for the specification of anonymity properties and propose algorithms for…

Cache side-channel attacks exhibit severe threats to software security and privacy, especially for cryptosystems. In this paper, we propose CaType, a novel refinement type-based tool for detecting cache side channels in crypto software.…

We present the first large-scale characterization of lateral phishing attacks, based on a dataset of 113 million employee-sent emails from 92 enterprise organizations. In a lateral phishing attack, adversaries leverage a compromised…

Leakage errors are unwanted transfer of population outside of a defined computational subspace and they occur in almost every platform for quantum computing. While prevalent, leakage is often overlooked when measuring and reporting the…

Conjunctive Searchable Symmetric Encryption (CSSE) enables secure conjunctive searches over encrypted data. While leakage-abuse attacks (LAAs) against single-keyword SSE have been extensively studied, their extension to conjunctive queries…

Different chaos synchronization based encryption schemes are reviewed and compared from the practical point of view. As an efficient cryptanalysis tool for chaos encryption, a proposal based on the Error Function Attack is presented…

Shared cache resources in multi-core processors are vulnerable to cache side-channel attacks. Recently proposed defenses have their own caveats: Randomization-based defenses are vulnerable to the evolving attack algorithms besides relying…

Flushing the cache, using instructions like clflush and wbinvd, is commonly proposed as a countermeasure against access-based cache attacks. In this report, we show that several Intel caches, specifically the L1 caches in some pre-Skylake…

We propose a method, based on program analysis and transformation, for eliminating timing side channels in software code that implements security-critical applications. Our method takes as input the original program together with a list of…

We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security domains (e.g., tenants in a cloud). Our approach dynamically…

Fault injection attacks represent a class of threats that can compromise embedded systems across multiple layers of abstraction, such as system software, instruction set architecture (ISA), microarchitecture, and physical implementation.…

This paper presents Packet Chasing, an attack on the network that does not require access to the network, and works regardless of the privilege level of the process receiving the packets. A spy process can easily probe and discover the…

This paper tackles the problem of designing efficient binary-level verification for a subset of information flow properties encompassing constant-time and secret-erasure. These properties are crucial for cryptographic implementations, but…

Security vulnerability analysis of Integrated Circuits using conventional design-time validation and verification techniques (like simulations, emulations, etc.) is generally a computationally intensive task and incomplete by nature,…

There can be performance and vulnerability concerns with block ciphers, thus stream ciphers can used as an alternative. Although many symmetric key stream ciphers are fairly resistant to side-channel attacks, cryptographic artefacts may…

We present SEIF, a methodology that combines static analysis with symbolic execution to verify and explicate information flow paths in a hardware design. SEIF begins with a statically built model of the information flow through a design and…

Cause-effect chains, as a widely used modeling method in real-time embedded systems, are extensively applied in various safety-critical domains. End-to-end latency, as a key real-time attribute of cause-effect chains, is crucial in many…

Quantitative information flow (QIF) is concerned with measuring how much of a secret is leaked to an adversary who observes the result of a computation that uses it. Prior work has shown that QIF techniques based on abstract interpretation…

Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) have been proposed as a solution to protect code confidentiality in scenarios where computation is outsourced to an untrusted operator. We study the resilience of such solutions to side-channel attacks…

Implementation flaws in cryptographic libraries, design flaws in underlying cryptographic primitives, and weaknesses in protocols using both, can all lead to exploitable vulnerabilities in software. Manually fixing such issues is…