相关论文: Quantifying the Information Leak in Cache Attacks …
Operating Systems enforce logical isolation using abstractions such as processes, containers, and isolation technologies to protect a system from malicious or buggy code. In this paper, we show new types of side channels through the file…
Resource leaks occur when a program fails to release a finite resource after it is no longer needed. These leaks are a significant cause of real-world crashes and performance issues. Given their critical impact on software performance and…
Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on the security of real-time systems. Timing leaks occur when an attacker is able to infer private behavior depending on timing information. In this work, we propose a definition of…
The wide deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) has given rise to strong demands for optimizing their inference performance. Today's techniques serving this purpose primarily focus on reducing latency and improving throughput through…
We introduce a privacy measure called statistic maximal leakage that quantifies how much a privacy mechanism leaks about a specific secret, relative to the adversary's prior information about that secret. Statistic maximal leakage is an…
Trusted execution environments (TEEs) provide an environment for running workloads in the cloud without having to trust cloud service providers, by offering additional hardware-assisted security guarantees. However, main memory encryption…
In this paper we describe a method for verifying secure information flow of programs, where apart from direct and indirect flows a secret information can be leaked through covert timing channels. That is, no two computations of a program…
In modern computing environments, hardware resources are commonly shared, and parallel computation is widely used. Parallel tasks can cause privacy and security problems if proper isolation is not enforced. Intel proposed SGX to create a…
The last level cache is vulnerable to timing based side channel attacks because it is shared by the attacker and the victim processes even if they are located on different cores. These timing attacks evict the victim cache lines using small…
In this paper we investigate the feasibility of denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on shared caches in multicore platforms. With carefully engineered attacker tasks, we are able to cause more than 300X execution time increases on a victim task…
Public development processes are a key characteristic of open source projects. However, fixes for vulnerabilities are usually discussed privately among a small group of trusted maintainers, and integrated without prior public involvement.…
Cooperative information systems typically involve various entities in a collaborative process within a distributed environment. Blockchain technology offers a mechanism for automating such processes, even when only partial trust exists…
Quantitative information flow analyses measure how much information on secrets is leaked by publicly observable outputs. One area of interest is to quantify and estimate the information leakage of composed systems. Prior work has focused on…
Information leakage can have dramatic consequences on systems security. Among harmful information leaks, the timing information leakage is the ability for an attacker to deduce internal information depending on the system execution time. We…
Side channel attacks are a major class of attacks to crypto-systems. Attackers collect and analyze timing behavior, I/O data, or power consumption in these systems to undermine their effectiveness in protecting sensitive information. In…
Cloud computing provides an effective business model for the deployment of IT infrastructure, platform, and software services. Often, facilities are outsourced to cloud providers and this offers the service consumer virtualization…
Side channel attacks steal secret keys by cleverly leveraging information leakages and can, therefore, break encryption. Thus, detection and mitigation of side channel attacks is a very important problem, but the solutions proposed in the…
This paper presents a scalable, practical approach to quantifying information leaks in software; these errors are often overlooked and downplayed, but can seriously compromise security mechanisms such as address space layout randomisation…
In a software system it is possible to quantify the amount of information that is leaked or corrupted by analysing the flows of information present in the source code. In a cyber-physical system, information flows are not only present at…
This paper studies the problem of reasoning about flow security properties in virtualised computing networks with mobility from perspective of formal language. We propose a distributed process algebra CSP_{4v} with security labelled…